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Abstract  
 
The main research problem in this thesis is the lack of a holistic understanding of 
how neo-patrimonialism, colonial legacies, decentralisation, illiberal peace-
building and the revitalisation of traditional reconciliation practices have affected 
conflict, peace and development in North Maluku Province (NMP). This is 
important to study, given the negative impacts inherent in the conflict-development 
nexus. In order to help bridge that research gap, the above stated processes have 
been conceptualised in a framework, which is incorporated in a qualitative case 
study design. In-depth interviews and the Reality Check Approach (RCA) are the 
main data-collection methods used to explore the research problem. The most 
significant findings are that the illiberal peace-building approach, coupled with a 
revitalisation of traditional adat practices, have been keys for the successful 
realisation of peaceful coexistence between Christians and Muslims in NMP, which 
suffered from a devastating communal war in 1999-2000.          
Keywords: North Maluku Province, North Halmahera Regency, illiberal-
peacebuilding, decentralisation, neo-patrimonialism, colonial legacies, 
reconciliation, communal violence, adat, Reality Check Approach, in-depth 
interviews   
Words: 21,990  
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Map 1. (Lencer 2013) 
Map of the Moluccas1: North Maluku Province (NMP) and Maluku 
Province (MP)  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The Moluccas refers to the Moluccan archipelago that encompasses both provinces.  
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Contextualization of the Study   
The fall of General Suharto’s New Order regime (1967-1998) was violent and 
unrest quickly spread across six Indonesian provinces. The most intense communal 
violence plagued the newly established NMP, from August 1999 until June 2000 
(Lawler 2008: 82, Brown, Wilson et al. 2005). Communal violence is ‘organised 
violence between non-state actors’ (Öberg, Strøm 2007: 3). This violent conflict 
has often been referred to as inter-communal wars; in plural to indicate that it 
involved more than one violent conflict/war, between different actors (Van Klinken 
2007).  
In the context of NMP, most of the violence divided the society along ethnic and 
religious lines, even though the roots and drivers were far more multifaceted (ibid.). 
This ethno-religious divide contrasted from Indonesia’s (globally) more well-
known secessionist conflicts in Timor Leste, Aceh and Papua (Van Klinken 2007, 
Greenlees, Garran 2002, Chomsky, Bourchier et al. 2006). During the inter-
communal wars, 3,257 people died and 15,004 buildings were destroyed, in NMP 
alone (Barron, Azca et al. 2012). In 2002, more than half a million people were still 
categorised as IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) in NMP and neighbouring MP 
(Duncan 2008).  
1.2 Research Design, Relevance and Research Gap(s)  
Much has now been written about these initial violent episodes during Indonesia’s 
era of reformasi (reformation) and democratisation. Yet, most previous research 
has been preoccupied with analysing macro-perspectives, often involving inter-
province comparisons of conflict-trajectories (Barron, Kaiser et al. 2009, Barron, 
Jaffrey et al. 2009, Barron, Jaffrey et al. 2010, Van Klinken 2007, Sidel 2006).  
2 
 
Comparative analyses may be great for certain aims, but they may also end up being 
deceptive, since they occasionally neglect context-specific factors. For example, 
agency, motivations, triggers and escalation factors often varied locally, in different 
areas of NMP. Thus, few previous studies have adopted a more holistic approach, 
incorporating the conflicts, peace-building, development and reconciliation 
processes within NMP, including both an elitist (etic) perspective, as well as a 
bottom-up, (non-elitist) emic perspective. The research gap in previous research is 
particularly wide regarding reconciliation efforts in Indonesia (Bräuchler 2009). 
This gap is important to bridge considering Indonesia’s violent history, as well as 
ongoing conflicts, which highlight a pressing need for successful peace, as well as 
reconciliation.  
The rationale of a holistic design is that these above stated processes are all 
important parts of a complex puzzle—that is difficult to solve, if the parts are 
analysed in isolation. The forthcoming analysis will be structured according to the 
conceptual framework, which highlights notions relating to colonial legacies, neo-
patrimonialism, decentralisation, illiberal peace-building and the revitalisation of 
local traditional adat 2  practices aimed at reconciliation. The data-collection 
methods in this qualitative case study are in-depth interviews and the Reality Check 
Approach (RCA), complemented by e-mail interviews, and critically assessed 
secondary sources. The RCA is a bottom-up approach, where researchers immerse 
several days and nights in a household of a family, in order to listen to, observe and 
experiencing their daily lives, thus over time informally exploring their voices 
(emic perspective), in relation to the research problem (EDG 2014: 4).  
On the contrary, the interviews will focus on capturing the etic, elite/expert 
perspective. Since truth is often indeed the first casualty of war, it is important to 
include as many different sources of information as possible, as triangulation 
increases the reliability of the findings. Christopher Duncan stresses the need to 
include an emic perspective, analysing different people’s subjective interpretations, 
                                                          
2 Explanations for the italicized Indonesian terms are provided among the abbreviations (above).   
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to understand why people made the decisions they did (2005: 54). Although there 
are several definitions of development, especially seen over time and from various 
disciplines, most have in common that they focus on improving and/or re-shaping 
the living conditions of people in various ways. Since this thesis involves an 
exploration, and a critical analysis, of the interrelated processes of peace/conflict, 
decentralisation, development and reconciliation in the context of a hybrid political 
order, it is thus highly relevant for political science and development studies.                
1.3 Research Problem, Aims, Delimitation and Questions 
The main research problem in this thesis is the lack of a holistic understanding of 
how the processes of neo-patrimonialism, colonial legacies, decentralisation, 
illiberal peace-building and the revitalisation of traditional reconciliation practices 
have affected conflict, peace and development in NMP. To increase the depth of 
the analysis, and to fit the scope of fieldwork in the province, I have made a 
delimitation to focus the fieldwork to three areas in NMP: Kao-Malifut and Tobelo 
in North Halmahera Regency (NHR) for the RCAs, and Ternate, for the majority 
of the in-depth interviews. Ternate was, and still is, the locus of politics in the 
province, and thus necessary to incorporate for capturing the etic perspective. The 
delimitation to focus on the NHR is motivated since it was the epicentre of the most 
vicious inter-communal violence in Indonesia, as it recorded nearly 75 percent of 
the deaths of the entire NMP, and like Ambon (capital of MP), the demography is 
almost evenly split between Christians and Muslims (Barron, Azca et al. 2012: 12).  
More importantly, NHR has managed to dramatically reverse the circle of violence 
in the post-conflict era, in stark contrast to most other Indonesian districts that 
suffered from extended communal conflicts, such as Ambon, and Poso in Sulawesi. 
Therefore, it is highly relevant to explore the voices of the local people here, in 
relation to overcoming violent conflicts and the work done to reconcile the 
communities. This study thus aims to contribute to a more holistic understanding 
of the above mentioned processes in relation to the case of NMP, and Ternate and 
NHR in particular. Additionally, since the study is embedded into a number of 
4 
 
broader debates within political science and development studies, such as 
decentralisation, neo-patrimonialism, legacies of colonialism, peace-building in a 
hybrid political order, as well as democratisation—it can therefore be seen as a 
minor contribution to the contemporary debates, in the above mentioned fields, 
particularly regarding adoption of the RCA methodology, which has predominantly 
been focused on poverty in the past. Yet, given the limited time for fieldwork in 
NMP (1,5 months) the aim of this study cannot reach much further than trying to 
be a modest contribution to previous research, perhaps flagging up new topics to be 
explored deeper in future studies.  
The above mentioned considerations are manifested in the following research 
questions: 
 In what ways were the communal wars and subsequent development in NMP 
influenced by colonial legacies and neo-patrimonialism? 
 
 How has decentralisation affected the communal wars and peace-building 
in NMP? 
 
 How did Indonesia’s illiberal peace-building approach affect the conflicts, 
and subsequent peace and development efforts in NMP? 
  
 How has the revitalisation of traditional ‘adat’ practices affected peace and 
reconciliation in NMP? 
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2 Background and Overview  
 
This chapter includes a literature review that provides a brief overview of the 
communal wars, the post-conflict period and a summary of the major peace, 
development and reconciliation efforts in NMP.   
2.1 Overview of the Communal Wars 
In order to understand the contexts and background to the peace, development and 
reconciliation efforts initiated after the communal wars, it is essential to get a basic 
understanding of the complexity behind the communal wars. The violent incidents 
are presented in chronological order and broadly grouped into MP and NMP. This 
is done for pedagogical reasons and not meant to be comparative, since the 
provincial boundaries were not of major importance regarding conflict causality, as 
will be explained below.   
2.1.1 Overview of the Communal Wars in MP 
The communal wars in the Moluccas started in the city of Ambon, on 19 January 
1999. At this time NMP was still part of MP3. Violence erupted on the last day of 
Ramadhan, with riots between Muslim (migrants) and Christian youths. The violent 
clashes soon spread around Ambon and other parts of MP. As soon as mosques and 
churches were set ablaze, or just rumours of it, the religious divide became the 
strongest mobilising factor (Van Klinken 2001: 3-4). Many women and children 
also got actively involved, as they helped making homemade weapons, and 
sometimes fight as well (HD Centre, LIPI & Current Asia 2011: 18). The deaths 
and displacement significantly escalated due to the involvement of Pasukan 
Siluman (deserted security personnel) and the subsequent spread of professional 
modern weapons, and by the arrival of the Laskar Jihad militia, from Java. At this 
                                                          
3 The provinces were separated in September 1999, as NMP was created. 
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time, in June 2000, the central government issued the status of civil emergency and 
heavy military reinforcements were positioned in MP, where the special joint 
battalion, Yongab, contributed to a decline of the conflict, along with their extended 
mandate, allowing curfew etc. (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005: 15-17). The emergency 
status lasted until September 2003 in MP, even though the formal peace agreement, 
Malino II, was signed on February 11, 2002 (ibid.)              
2.1.2 Overview of the Communal Wars in NMP 
When the communal wars in MP had raged for months, NMP had still avoided any 
outbreaks of large-scale violence, as most people regarded the violence to be a local 
Ambonese thing. However, tensions arose in the area of Kao-Malifut, as the 
Government Regulation No. 42/1999 was passed. This formally established a new 
kecamatan (sub-district) of Malifut, for the Makian transmigrants, who had lived in 
the area for 25 years. 4 For most of that time, they had been lobbying for their own 
kecamatan (Duncan 2005). The indigenous ethnic Kaos strongly opposed this 
initiative, but partly since they were not well represented in the local government 
(unlike the Makians), the sub-district was made legit (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005: 
31, Duncan 2005: 61).  
Relations between the two ethnic groups had been tense from the very beginning. 
The Kaos’ regarded the land given to the Makians, to be their ancestral land and 
they perceived that the Makians received privileged treatment by the (Makian-
dominated) local government. According to the Makians though, ‘…the indigenous 
[Kao] people were lazy and resented the Makian for their economic and political 
successes’5 (Duncan 2005: 63). The Makians further viewed the land given to them 
being from the national government, and did not recognise the Kaos adat-based 
ownership (Wilson 2005). In addition, Makians are Muslim, while the Kaos are 
                                                          
4 The Makians had been replaced there, against the will of many, by the Indonesian Government 
in 1975, due to increased volcanic activity on Makian Island. 
5 Makians have a long tradition of valuing education and employment in the bureaucracy, and their 
success in these areas are more related to hard work, than aristocratic connections with the 
sultanate in Ternate (Van Klinken (2007: 115). 
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majority Christian, yet, with a minority of around 10 percent being ‘Kao Muslim’. 
The stakes were raised higher in June 1999, as mining company PT Nusa 
Halmahera Mineral (NHM) 6 , initiated open-cut goldmining in Gosowong, 
southwest of Malifut, with 90 percent of the local employees hired being of Makian 
ethnicity (Wilson 2005). Additionally, many Kaos feared that the legal recognition 
of kecamatan Malifut would be a step towards making Malifut a capital of a 
possible future regency, which would entitle the Malifut community with large 
royalties from the mining. Another serious objection from the Kao community was 
the new kecamatan’s border, which included five Kao villages that would thus be 
cut off from their adat-community in kecamatan Kao.  
In line with the Kaos’ continued opposition to the new kecamatan, the conflict 
escalated on August 18, 1999 and violence broke out in Sosol, which is one of the 
Kao villages that was included, against their will, in the Makian kecamatan. The 
dispute escalated as Sosol was burned to the ground by Makians, who torched both 
churches and schools, and the villagers fled to the capital, Kao7 (Wilson 2005: 83). 
Later, the Kao village of Wangeotak faced the same trajectory. The Kaos 
counterattacked over the next few days, destroying infrastructure in the eastern part 
of Malifut, but were eventually stopped as security forces arrived from Tobelo town 
(Wilson 2005).  
The new bupati (regent) of North Maluku Regency, Rusli Andiaco, along with the 
sultan of Ternate, Mudaffar Syah, then visited Kao, in a mediation-attempt to 
prevent escalation. The Kao leaders’ demanded the cancellation of kecamatan 
Malifut and that the government would rebuild Sosol and Wangeotak, while some 
even demanded the exodus of the Makian community from the area (Wilson 2005: 
85). Within the next couple of months, the Kao leaders’ tried to solve the conflict 
using diplomacy, but received no reconstruction funds for the destroyed villages, 
                                                          
6 NHM is 75 percent owned by Australian Newcrest Mining Ltd, and 25 percent by PT Aneka 
Tambang (Persero) (www.nhm.co.id).  
7 Kao is, somewhat confusingly, the name of the capital of kecamatan Kao, name of the indigenous 
ethnic population of Kao that includes the Pagu, Modole, Tobelo Boeng, and Toliliko that includes 
the Kao Islam sub-ethnic group.    
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nor was the Makian kecamatan revoked. When a couple of months had passed 
without any action from the government, Kao leaders decided to retaliate against 
the Makian themselves. They used homemade weapons 8  and magical attacks 9 
(Wilson 2005). On 25 October 1999, the Kao militia leader, Benny Bitjara, led 
about 15,000 Pasukan (militia) Kao and attacked Malifut. The security forces were 
completely outnumbered, and could not interfere. Many Makians had already fled, 
following the rising tensions, however, the remaining Makians in Malifut were 
overwhelmed and fled, leaving only three casualties (Wilson 2005: 88). The 
subsequent destruction was massive, as the Kaos burned and/or bombed all 16 
villages in Malifut. As the Makians shared stories about the horrors of the conflict 
in Kao-Malifut, coupled with the ongoing inter-religious communal wars in MP, 
tensions quickly increased in Ternate City, as well as on the neighbouring island 
Tidore (ibid.).  
The trigger that started large-scale violence became ‘the Bloody Sosol letter’ (Sosol 
Berdarah), which called for Christians to cleanse the area of Muslims, Makians in 
particular. Even though the letter was quickly found to be unauthentic, it had been 
photocopied and distributed to many Muslim communities in Ternate, and Tidore, 
by Makian leader Fahri Almari10, as well as members of the district parliament 
(Wilson 2008: 84). On November 3, anti-Christian riots erupted with direct relation 
to Sosol Berdarah, which started with the lynching of Reverend Risakotta, head of 
Gereja Protestan Maluku (GPM) the protestant church on Tidore. He was hacked 
to death with machetes, and subsequently set on fire, by an angry crowd after trying 
to explain that the letter was false. The following riots killed 35 Christians, three 
churches were set on fire, and 260 homes left shattered, and all surviving Christians 
became IDPs and were evacuated from Tidore by the navy (Wilson 2008: 86, 
Duncan 2005: 67). Three days later the riots spread to Ternate, as hundreds of armed 
                                                          
8 This included: bows and arrows, spears, shields, machetes, and made their own style of the 
Molotov cocktail by extracting sulfur from bombs found on sunken Japanese WWII battleships.  
9 According to interviews by Christopher Duncan, the Kaos claim they killed several Makians using 
people with strong magical powers ‘ilmu gaib’.  
10 For a discussion of the possible origin of the false letter, see (Wilson 2008: 84).  
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Muslims entered the streets wearing white headbands, the colour used by the 
Muslim forces in the communal violence in MP. Therefore, they were called 
Pasukan Putih, the white troops, and the Sultan of Ternate’s adat-forces were 
wearing yellow, thus called Pasukan Kuning (yellow troops). In the riots, 31 people 
were killed, 353 houses destroyed, along with six churches, and the Indonesian navy 
subsequently had to evacuate over 19,000, mostly Christians, to Sulawesi and 
Halmahera (Wilson 2008: 89). As Pasukan Kuning and the Sultan of Ternate were 
defeated by Pasukan Putih, the sultan surrendered and left North Maluku, and 
importantly, had to agree not to run in the upcoming gubernatorial election, 
revealing some of the political elites’ incentives (Barron, Azca et al. 2012: 66).  
After the Ternate riots, the violence spread to Halmahera again, as Pasukan Putih, 
attacked Christian villages, as revenge for the destruction of Malifut. Many IDPs 
fled to majority Christian areas, as Tobelo city, North Sulawesi or Bacan, and 
brought with them stories of the horrors of war. There were multi-faith efforts aimed 
at easing the rising tensions, for example to dismiss false rumours, but eventually 
violence erupted in Tobelo and in the neighbouring Sub-district of Galela, including 
several massacres in the name of religion. Soon after this the violence engulfed 
most areas of NMP, such as Bacan, Morotai, and Obi. In June 2000, over a hundred 
Christians were killed by Pasukan Putih and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) 
declared civil emergency, along with troop reinforcements (Brown, Wilson et al. 
2005). However, this GoI initiative happened after the two sides already had fought 
to a stalemate in Tobelo/Galela, with considerable losses on both sides—leading to 
widespread conflict fatigue, coupled with a realisation that neither side could win, 
as the military now blocked any movements of militias  (Barron, Azca et al. 2012: 
11).  
2.1.3 The Post-conflict Period  
The term ‘post-conflict period’ may be conceptually blurred, as (minor) violent 
episodes continued to occur, even after the official end of the wars. Here, the term 
refers to the time when the wars had stopped, thus July 2000 in NMP (February 
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2002 in MP) and most reports stretch the post-conflict period up until 2008, since 
large-scale violence were almost non-existent after that, also in MP (Barron, Azca 
et al. 2012). GoI’s major (but late) response had been the implementation of civil 
emergency status, which lasted until May 2003 in NMP, and September 2003 in 
MP. The official GoI peace initiative, the Malino II peace agreement, in 2002, 
mainly focused on MP. Even after this period, episodes of violence have continued 
to erupt in MP from time to time. In February 2012, five people were killed and 
several houses burned to the ground on Haruku Island in MP.11  
Contrary to the continued violence in MP, NMP has almost completely managed to 
avoided new large-scale episodes of violence. When it did erupt, the violence was 
related to the gubernatorial election in 2007, as the voting count was disputed 
between Thaib Armaiyn and Abdul Gafur. No deaths occurred, however, bullets 
were fired and bombs were used, and around 50 people were injured, leaving 34 
buildings damaged or destroyed (Barron, Azca et al. 2012: 21-22). To sum up the 
post-conflict period, it is important to note that the Malino II accord constituted a 
turning point in the GoI’s response to conflict management, and entered a phase 
more focused on conflict recovery and peace-building. However, the Malino II was 
only focused on MP, which left much of the peace-building and reconciliation work 
in NMP to local actors and people at the grassroots level. 
2.1.4 Peace, Development and Reconciliation Efforts 
In NMP, the GoI’s main approach was to re-inforce the security forces. The 
different actions of the Indonesian military (TNI) in relation to peace and 
reconciliation in NMP were ambiguous throughout the conflict and post-conflict 
period. In the latter, they did help to facilitate some of the early reconciliation efforts 
in NHR, called the Mamuya meetings (starting in August 2000).  
                                                          
11 At that time, I was visiting the Moluccas for the first time and was staying at the neighbouring 
Island of Saparua, right opposite Haruku. The following week, when visiting nearby Seram Island, I 
witnessed rifled-armed militia, as they passed by the village I resided on, as violence erupted again 
in central Maluku, within MP. 
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The number of participants grew with each meeting, and the third gathering was 
large, attended by 600 people from both communities, as well as the current Vice-
president Megawati and other officials from the national and regional governments. 
Yet, as Duncan (2008: 223) argues, these had minor impact, sometimes even 
contrary effect, as some people were offended by statements from officials insisting 
that ‘all is well’ and that people should forget the past. There were also some minor 
new outbreaks of violence in NMP, which have been blamed on provocations by 
some military units, trying to extend their stay and thus profit from the unrest. This 
led to demands from many villages throughout NMP to get rid of the military 
presence (Duncan 2005: 79).  
Therefore, most other peace meetings were organised locally, without military 
involvement, for example the Halmahera Baku Dapa 1, 20-31 January 2000. It was 
sponsored by the Christian organisation Halmahera Community Resilience 
Organisation, and agreement was made that reconciliation efforts should be based 
locally, utilising adat cultural traditions, to bridge the religious divide (Barron, 
Azca et al. 2012). Similar local interfaith initiatives, which ended with local peace 
agreements, happened in the town of Jailolo (western Halmahera) and in kecamatan 
Sahu (Duncan 2014: 107). 
On 19 April 2001, a peace declaration was made in Tobelo, involving leaders from 
both religious communities. The ceremony was held in the traditional Hibualamo12 
field, and the language used was the local ethnic-based Tobelo language. Other 
similarly local peace declaration was signed in Morotai on 29 May, and in Galela 
on 30 June. The largest event was perhaps the declaration to work for the 
establishment of a new regency in North Halmahera, on 12 January 2002, which 
brought several leaders from the two sides together with agreements to (re)build 
solidarity between all groups in the future regency (Barron, Azca et al. 2012). In 
the light of increasingly successful peace-building locally in NMP, the GoI focused 
on funding reconstruction and recovery programmes, allocating large budgets to the 
                                                          
12 Traditional Tobelo community adat-house. 
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local governments over a three-year period, beginning in 2004. Another focus for 
the national, and regional, governments was to resolve the many complicated 
problems involving IDPs. Progress has been made and in April 2004, about 75 
percent of the 200,000 displaced people in NMP had returned home, or permanently 
settled elsewhere. Problems hindering a complete resolution involve corruption of 
IDP funds, reluctance of some IDPs to return to their native villages, as well as 
resentment among some local communities, arguing that the IDPs receive 
privileged treatment by the government (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005).  
Humanitarian responses have also involved several non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and 
civil society organisations (CSOs), where the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) has been a key coordinating player. Focus areas for the INGOs 
have been health and sanitation, education programmes, livelihoods assistance, 
rebuilding infrastructure, as well as mental rehabilitation. These efforts were often 
carried out by local NGOs, (often sponsored by INGOs), as local actors often have 
better impact and legitimacy with the local population. Most efforts have been 
regarded fruitful, yet, critique has arisen claiming that the coordination has been 
poor 13  between INGOs and the provincial and national governments (Brown, 
Wilson et al. 2005).     
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 ‘Poor coordination’ in this context should be understood as the diplomatic way of highlighting 
corruption of INGO-sponsored  IDP funds, by the provincial government elite (Smith 2009).   
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3 Conceptual Framework 
 
I argue that this framework, in a broad sense, is an example of development theory 
as conceptualised by Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2010: 1-2) that interlinks politics, 
ideology and explanation, aiming to establish a critical and systematic approach to 
reflections regarding the research problem. Therefore, it merges various concepts 
and notions, as well as brings to light the legacies of colonialism, which is needed 
in order to fully understand the historical roots to the communal wars in the 
Moluccas.  
3.1 European Colonialism and Neo-patrimonialism 
This part first sheds light on the dark legacies of European colonialism, as some of 
these legacies still linger on today in the former colonies. The second part explains 
and discusses the conceptual underpinnings of neo-patrimonialism. 
3.1.1 Legacies and Characteristics of European Colonialism      
It should not be denied that the historic roots of the development field has been 
influenced by the ideas of Enlightenment and the European powers ventures of 
conquest, trade and colonialism, and the subsequent spread of capitalism (Li 2007). 
Thus, the ideas of evolution and progress were inherent to the view of the 
irrevocable development of societies in stages, where the Western world was the 
obvious role model (Cowen, Shenton 1996).  
During the 19th century, arguments about alleged racial superiority of Europeans 
started to gain ground at the end of the century. In relation to the development field, 
these racist ideas can be exemplified by the poem from 1899: the white man’s 
burden (to improve the Natives’ lives) (Li 2007: 32). A common colonial tactic was 
division of local communities, using various strategies. Sometimes the divide was 
racialized and oftentimes coupled with notions of different subgroups’ potential for 
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improvement. This had of course horrific consequences for those deemed 
‘unimprovable’, as some people or subgroups could be annihilated, in line with the 
rationale of natural selection (Li 2007: 15). Thus, oppression was a strong 
characteristic of the Europeans’ rule—a structure that was often put into practice 
indirectly, as the colonial powers preferred to reinforce existing local elite rulers. 
This enabled more efficient accumulation of wealth for the colonisers, and their 
companies, by scaling up the pre-established systems of appanages, forced labour, 
tax farms, usury, and most importantly for the colonisers—the trading monopolies 
(ibid.: 32).  
A prevailing pattern was that the colonisers, and their elite puppets, used their 
increased wealth to further cement their positions of power, leaving the local 
population poor, and often marginalised (Jönsson, Jerneck et al. 2012: 85).   
Likewise, land rights and geographical borders were to a large extent manipulated 
and drawn by the colonial powers, which included, as Johnson (2009: 176) argues: 
‘the systematic erosion of customary rights to land…’.  
A further tactic adopted by the colonial powers to legitimise their rule, was to 
reinforce the locals’ indigenous traditions, as they stressed the importance of 
preventing the locals to become too much like their colonial masters. Thus, 
somewhat absurdly, as Li writes (2007: 15) ‘Intervention was needed to teach (or 
oblige) natives to be truly themselves’. Important to note moreover, is that some 
institutions crystallised during colonialism and some traits, or consequences, still 
linger on today. Local elites were often bribed and provided weapons, in order to 
rule (suppress) the local population (Jönsson, Jerneck et al. 2012: 86).  
Since many developing states were to a large extent shaped and influenced by 
colonialism, it is vital to understand this part of their history, in order to understand 
the present, or more recent history (Mahoney, Thelen 2009). Thus, in this thesis the 
colonial legacies are recognised, however, they are seen as one of many parts in a 
multidimensional understanding of the developments in NMP. 
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3.1.2 Neo-patrimonialism 
Neo-patrimonialism is a child born out of a marriage between modern bureaucracy 
and patrimonialism (i.e. a pre-modern governance type where those with (absolute) 
power are governing through personal ties). Therefore, the underpinning of this 
governance structure involves corruption by local elites in relation to state assets, 
by the means of bureaucracy and industries/companies in control of the state. Atul 
Kohli (2004: 393) characterises the neo-patrimonial state as suffering from severe 
fragmentation, difficulties dealing with regional interests—this foster a national 
development ideology marked by inefficiency. Common implications here are that 
a tiny elite extract the natural resources, as well as controlling the state or domain 
like a family patriarch, strengthening their own position; this is often a colonial 
legacy, and a major obstacle to development.  
3.2 The Conflict (and Peace)—Development Nexus  
This nexus is of course complex and multifaceted, but put very simple: violent 
conflicts have several negative effects on development (World Bank 2011: 4). 
Violent conflict often results in a weakening of the workforce through involvement 
in the violence, and also indirectly by displacement, restrictions of movement, 
hunger and disease. Damages to social, and physical, infrastructure negatively 
impacts power supplies, transport networks, as well as health and education 
services. Econometric studies have provided evidence showing a clear connection 
between insecurity and poverty, as well as vice versa (Thomas, Williams 2013: 
307). Therefore, many of these trends will be reversed if violence is substituted with 
the consolidation of peace.  
3.3 Decentralisation 
Decentralisation in this thesis should be understood as the process where ‘central 
governments transfer political, fiscal and administrative powers to lower levels in 
an administrative and territorial hierarchy’ (Duncan 2007: 713). Consequently, it is 
closely linked to the notion of (increased) regional autonomy. In a global 
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perspective, the last decades have witnessed an increasing decentralisation-trend, 
oftentimes backed by influential multi-lateral institutions, for example the World 
Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Subbarao, White 2005). 
Proponents of decentralisation claim that there are links between good governance 
and decentralisation, as it creates incentives for local officials to be more responsive 
to local needs and aspirations (Ribot 2004: 11). It is further stressed that 
decentralisation is in line with a growing democratisation process, since it is 
supposed to transfer political control, closer the local citizens (Crook, Manor 1998, 
Manor, World Bank 1999).  
It is hypothesised that accountability increases along with greater community 
participation, which in turn should foster better political policies and less corruption 
(Agrawal, Ribot 1999). However, the question of decreasing corruption has been 
heavily debated, and likely more factors/contexts need to be considered, see for 
example Bardhan and Mookherje (2000) and Fisman and Gatti (2002). Champions 
of decentralisation further stress that natural resource management will be 
improved, given decreased power distances to the local communities—they argue 
that if people have a connection to the environment, it is more likely that sustainable 
practices are adopted (Kaimowitz, Ribot 2002).  
Furthermore, on the one hand, decentralisation is theorised to have a positive impact 
for minority groups within countries, since they should be better recognised and 
acknowledged if they gain increased control over political processes (Kaimovitz, 
Vallejos et al. 1998, Kälin 1999). On the other hand, others oppose that view, and 
claim that local elites easily get corrupted when power is suddenly decentralised in 
their favour, which may result in continued marginalisation and exclusion of certain 
minority groups (Resosudarmo 2004, Hadiz 2004). Critical analysts maintain that 
the regional elite sometimes only remain accountable towards majority groups, as 
they (their votes) are most important to secure their power in a democratic vote. 
Correspondingly, local minority groups risk being marginalised (Ribot 2004). This 
is in line with findings from a UNDP report (2006: 36), in Vietnam, which stated 
that the widely held prejudice that ‘ethnic minorities have low capacity and a low 
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intellectual level has been a significant obstacle to increased minority participation’. 
Lastly, as Gerry van Klinken argues, if decentralisation of power also involves 
substantial increases of funds, coupled with vague or insufficient anti-corruption 
monitoring, it may create polarisation and competition among local elites, in order 
to gain monetary benefits from the transition (Van Klinken 2007: 112-113). To sum 
up, decentralisation in theory, is attached with many benefits in a democratic 
perspective, however, to move from theory to practice has also triggered problems 
in relation to rapid shifts of authority.                      
3.4 Illiberal Peace-building and Hybrid Political Orders 
This section first introduces the concept of illiberal peace-building, where it will be 
defined and discussed in relation to the liberal model. The second part 
conceptualises and discusses hybrid political orders.   
3.4.1 Illiberal Peace-building 
In this thesis, illiberal peace-building should be understood as an approach where a 
central government uses autocratic/illiberal methods to secure peace, such as 
restoring neo-patrimonial networks, halting democratic elections, rolling back 
reforms of the bureaucracy, re-establishing heavy military presence and impunity 
for corrupt local elites, (if they are loyal to the central government) (Smith 2014). 
These methods are often considered unpalatable by the central government, yet 
necessary, in order to reach a negative peace (i.e., the absence of war) (Galtung 
1969, Smith 2014). In order to further conceptualise illiberal models of peace-
building, it is helpful to also introduce more characteristics of the liberal model, to 
highlight discrepancies.  
The majority of the international peace-building interventions after the Cold War 
have followed the liberal model’s logic. In essence here, is the ‘triple transition’: 
moving from war to peace through the social, political and economic spheres (Paris, 
Sisk 2009). The international UN intervention in Timor Leste can serve as an 
empirical example of liberal-sponsored peace-building, whereas Mahindra 
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Rajapaksa’s peace-building in Sri Lanka often is depicted as a hybrid with strong 
illiberal traits (Höglund, Orjuela 2012). Programmes following a liberal, or 
neoliberal rationale, commonly promote reforms of the security and legal sectors, 
political and market deregulations, decentralisation and the creation/strengthening 
of democratic institutions. Within academia, following the dominance of liberal 
peace-building in practice, much attention has focused on assessing the liberal 
model’s implementation. Here, a common critique being the failure to sponsor 
state-building when moving from theory to practice (Paris, Sisk 2009).  
Moreover, scholars have highlighted several unintended ‘illiberal effects’ caused 
by liberal peace-building efforts, such as higher degrees of violence in post-conflict 
periods (Berdal, Suhrke 2013), establishment of predatory elites (Richmond 2009), 
discouragement of development vis-à-vis security (Duffield 2001), weaker local 
governance (especially welfare institutions) (Hughes 2009), exclusion of local 
representation and destabilising effects of democratisation (Mac Ginty 2008). 
Another frequent issue in the critical literature on liberal peace-building is the 
promotion of Western democratic institutions as a universal model. First, it results 
in a depiction of states that does not meet this criteria as automatically portrayed as 
‘failed/fragile’ and thus, according to scholars of critical development theory, this 
idea can be viewed as part of Western cultural imperialism (Escobar 2011). Second, 
given that the modern Western-style Weberian state hardly exists outside the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), it thus 
exposes the narrowness of the concept (Boege, Brown et al. 2008).  
Third, it largely ignores the historical contexts of many post-colonial developing 
countries as still being in the beginning of a state-building process, if compared to 
state-building processes in the Western world which took centuries (Hameiri 2007). 
Consequently, it falls into the pit of one-dimensional cookie-cutter recipes for 
development that lack an awareness of colonial legacies (Jönsson, Jerneck et al. 
2012: 89, Kohli 2004). Hence, these models do not provide a suitable lens for 
analysing non-liberal, often state-led, peace-building efforts. Having said that, 
illiberal means of conflict resolution have of course also produced failed outcomes, 
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but that has not always been the case (Smith 2014). Sometimes states have 
deliberately chosen to follow a different path. Academics have revealed that 
illiberal means in some cases have contributed to violence reduction in conflict 
areas and thus have potential to be part of a stable route to peace, and not always 
an indication of state failure (Smith 2014: 1510). However, given the (democratic) 
costs related to illiberal peace-building, it is necessary to carefully examine its 
effect on violent conflict, sustainable peace and development.  
3.4.2 Hybrid Political Orders 
Many countries that have aimed to transition from autocracy to democracy, have 
met resistance along the way and sometimes ended up in a hybrid position, for a 
short or longer period of time. The term ‘hybrid political order’ has been discussed 
by several scholars in different academic disciplines, thus including a multitude of 
analyses, comparisons and categorisations between different regime types 
(Widmalm, Oskarsson 2010, Wigell 2008, Brownlee 2009, Diamond 2002). The 
adoption of the concept ‘hybrid political order’ is relevant for this study, because 
illiberal peace-building is a model predominantly used by states in transition to 
democracy, characterised by a contested political environment.  
I have chosen to implement the concept as presented by Volker Boege et al. (2008: 
10), they stress that places often depicted as ‘fragile’ are diverse in the sense that 
authority is highly contested and competing power-claims usually exist, overlap, 
and interact, such as: ‘the logic of the formal state, of traditional informal societal 
order (e.g., adat laws in Indonesia), and of globalisation and associated social 
fragmentation (which is present in various forms: ethnic, income level, 
religious…)’. Claire Smith (2014) argues that the consequences of liberals, neo-
liberals and illiberals unwillingness to negotiate with different models of 
peacebuilding, other than the model corresponding to their own worldview, often 
result in more deadly outcomes. Negotiated settlements between ‘ideologically 
incompatible’ enemies may be politically unpleasant. However, the alternatives, 
such as foreign military intervention, often turn out more disastrous for all parties 
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(Smith 2014). Previous research regarding some of the so-called failing states, has 
demonstrated successful consolidations of (negative) peace, in regard to halting 
violent episodes and the promotion of basic levels of economic, social and political 
stability, by engaging with illiberal means. Here, the theory is suggesting, as Smith 
(2014: 1511) conveys:  
The sustenance or creation of neo-patrimonial networks can buy in restive local elites to a 
central state-building project—cementing emergent or contested forms of a state and securing 
forms of peace.          
 
3.6 Reconciliation 
In this section I initially conceptualise reconciliation and present the definition(s) 
adopted in this thesis. This is followed by a section where the concept is 
problematized, and lastly revitalisation of traditional culture is discussed in relation 
to reconciliation.  
3.6.1 Conceptualising Reconciliation 
When episodes of violence or wars have been brought to an end, there are often 
lingering ‘negative emotional residues’, which might ignite violence again if not 
removed (Jeong 2009: 214). Every conflict is different, but there are very few 
violent conflicts that do not result in physical and emotional separations among the 
involved communities. The foundations of such divisions feed on continued 
uncertainty, anger and fear. If widespread, this presents serious challenges to 
building a sustainable peace in the post-conflict era. Difficulties relating to such 
processes have been evident in post-conflict reconciliation efforts in former 
Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone and Cambodia. Such cases have displayed that the post-
conflict process is often marked by distress as emotional injuries linger due to post-
traumatic stress disorders, caused by the previous exposure to atrocities, death of 
family members and friends. This is often coupled with anger due to loss of 
employment and property, as well as internal displacement. Troubles regarding the 
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suppression of grief and fear may end up in desires for restorative justice and 
revenge (Jeong 2009). Therefore, reconciliation is necessary to put in a wider 
context that incorporates both psychological, as well as negative social effects of 
violent conflict, for example alienation and marginalisation. Since recent history of 
violent conflict horrors are likely to linger on in the minds of many people, 
reconciliation efforts need to be carefully considered and seen as a long-term 
process with several dimensions. These dimensions, or notions, come with various 
labels by scholars from different disciplines.  
Most agree that coexistence is a vital first objective of reconciliation (Jeong 2009, 
Bhargava 2012, Sampson 2003). Political theorist Rajeev Bhargava describes 
coexistence as the thin notion of reconciliation, which could be characterised as 
‘reconciliation as resignation’ (Bhargava 2012). This is further a common notion of 
reconciliation if a war has ended in a stalemate between two sides. This stems from 
that both sides have to adapt to the fact that no side won and thus expectations have 
to be adjusted in line with coexistence. However, as Ho-Won Jeong proclaims ‘In 
order to realise coexistence, the most essential element is a change in the attitudes 
and behaviour of the adversaries’ (Jeong 2009: 214). Elementary parts of this is to 
establish mutual respect for each other’s different identities and thus grow a 
common humanity in order to encourage a new future deprived of othering, 
dehumanisation, fear and similar notions that may be used to justify aggression 
between groups.  
If communities are to be able to move on after having experienced a violent conflict, 
there is need for social space where people can express their grief, and also 
confronting lingering fears and/or myths relating to the troubled past. Social bonds 
may be re-twined by the means of initiating processes of mourning and 
remembrance (Daly, Sarkin 2011). Ho-Won Jeong (2009: 214) reasons that:  
Rehumanizing the enemy may start from a commitment to take the risk of a journey for 
reconciliation and to accept the choice to forgive. The process of restoring justice starts with 
the admission of guilt by perpetrators and public apology.  
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Relating to the pros of decentralisation and regional autonomy (see 3.3), it has also 
been argued that these processes, in theory, improve conflict resolution and 
reconciliation, as local people can play a bigger role (Laksono 2004, Permana 
2002). This argument stems from the idea that local village leaders possess unique 
knowledge and understanding regarding local forms of conflict resolution, for 
example customary law, which outside mediators often lack.     
3.6.2 Problematizing Reconciliation 
Recent cases of violent conflicts in different parts of the globe have often been 
followed by cookie cutter attempts for reconciliation, typically involving models 
for truth commissions, (effective) law enforcement, justice, human rights, and 
sometimes amnesty and forgiveness (Bräuchler 2009: 3). Proponents of such 
approaches have often been INGOs embedded in liberal-peacebuilding operations 
(Lambourne 2009, Mac Ginty 2008). There is a need to problematize such attempts 
to reconciliation in order to avoid approaches cloaked in universality, and 
particularly, approaches containing un-reflexive standardisation of comparative 
models (Huyse 2003: 163, Darby 2003).  
Steve Sampson has highlighted a further critique, as he claims that most 
reconciliation approaches take for granted that the situation prior to the outbreak of 
violent conflict, should have been characterised by peace, friendship and 
understanding. However, as Sampson puts it (2002: 181) such circumstances most 
likely existed only as someone’s nostalgia. Another potential problem relating to 
reconciliation is the ambiguity of the term itself; what exactly is reconciliation? 
There is a vast amount of different conceptualisations relating to various 
understandings of reconciliation, revealing a ‘concept that defies clarity’ 
(Weinstein 2011). This is related to the inherent multidimensionality of the concept 
itself. It is a process intersecting at various levels, for example, between different 
nations, communities, persons, as well as between the individual and community 
level (Bräuchler 2009: 3). In this thesis, two notions of reconciliation have been 
selected, to aid the subsequent analysis. The first is Bhargava’s weak notion of 
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reconciliation—peaceful coexistence (described above). The second is a stronger 
version of the concept, characterised as ‘a condition that must be realised by 
collective effort of two or more groups’, as well as ‘refers to the cancellation of 
enmity or estrangement, via the owning-up of responsibility for wrongdoing 
followed by forgiveness’ (Bhargava 2012: 371). This stronger notion of 
reconciliation is regularly associated with accountability, apologising/forgiveness 
and shared truth (Duncan 2015).       
3.6.3 Reconciliation by a Revitalisation of Traditional Culture   
In relation to an amplified critique of the marginal achievements of top-down 
approaches to reconciliation, grassroots approaches have gained momentum. Many 
of these efforts have in common that they have focused on localised cultural, 
traditional and indigenous practices (Babo-Soares 2004, Bräuchler 2009, Baines 
2007). Apart from being bottom-up in general, they differ from the universally-
cloaked approaches since they are argued to better capture the agency of the local 
people and civil society actors.  
Furthermore, they have a greater potential to grasp the relevant sociocultural peace-
building context, being anchored from below (Bräuchler 2009, Duncan 2015). 
Important understandings here, (given that these approaches are based on culture, 
are that this concept is adaptive, as well as diverse, depending on different 
conceptualisations in different places and over time, as socio-political realities are 
dynamic (Bräuchler 2009: 888). Relating to this is a view of identity, whether it is 
currently most influenced by culture, or political factors, as a notion that can be 
rearticulated in the present, as well as constructed in the future (Hall 1996, Hall 
1985: 113). Partly relating to this diverse and subjective character of traditional 
cultural approaches, critics have argued that approaches based on localised 
traditional notions, such as customary law, also involve risks, especially in 
heterogeneous regions comprising various ethnic groups, as well as migrant 
populations. This is because these groups could hold different traditional 
understandings in relation to peace and conflict management. Thus, a dominant 
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ethnic group’s traditional way of reconciling the community, could be excluding 
migrants, or push them to assimilate to the dominant groups’ customary rules, and 
thus face the danger of being counter-productive (as it may cause further disputes) 
(Acciaioli 2001).  
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4  Methodology 
 
This chapter presents the methodological and philosophical considerations I have 
made in relation to this study. It includes discussions on reflexivity, the qualitative 
case study design, the data-collection methods, assessment of secondary sources, 
as well as qualitative data analysis.   
4.1 Methodological and Philosophical Considerations 
I agree with David Silverman (2013: 10) who stresses that research becomes more 
effective if arbitrary assumptions about the intrinsic superiority of certain methods 
are rejected. Indeed, within development studies, much research mirror this view, 
as inter-disciplinarity and mix-methods are common (Sumner, Tribe 2008). In this 
thesis, the methods have been chosen with consideration of the research problem 
and research questions. Therefore, a combination of qualitative methods (RCA and 
in-depth interviews) have been preferred, since my aim does not put emphasis on 
answering questions of ‘how many?’, nor to generate a usable large-n dataset etc. 
This design may still be labelled a mixed methods approach, since the mixing is not 
limited to a mix of quantitative and qualitative designs (Morse, Niehaus 2009: 20). 
This design reflects my preference, in this study, to explore ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ 
questions. This interest connects well with an ontological recognition of multiple 
realities.  
This thesis is not theory-driven and thus mainly inductive. The theoretical 
framework will predominantly be adopted as a way to guide the analysis, to make 
sense of the findings, in contrast to a deductive cause-and-effect based design. 
Therefore, this study has incorporated an interpretive framework, or worldview, 
related to social constructivism, since the participants’ subjective meanings are 
recognised as having been negotiated socially and historically (Creswell 2012: 24-
25). Axiologically, I agree with the claim that research is value-laden and may not 
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be fully free from bias (Hoglund, Oberg 2011). I view the participants in this study 
as people with agency and voice, (and not as merely sources of data), the methods 
chosen reflects this epistemological view. This is evident by my aim of adopting a 
two-way process focusing on inclusion of the participants and positioning of the 
researcher as a listener (May 2011: 21). The in-depth interviews and RCAs were 
complemented by an analysis of relevant secondary sources. Additionally, two 
email interviews were conducted with prominent scholars, who have published 
extensively on conflict, decentralisation, peace-building, development and 
reconciliation efforts in North Maluku, namely, Anthropologist Christopher 
Duncan14 and Political Scientist Christopher Wilson.15 Both have experience of 
extensive periods of fieldwork in NMP as well. 
4.1.1 Reflexivity 
Research is never completely free from bias and therefore the best way of reducing 
it, is to be transparent about the study’s design, including my own background, role, 
motivations and previous experiences, in relation to the research problem—this 
improves the validity and reliability of the study (Sumner, Tribe 2008: 187, 
Jönsson, Jerneck et al. 2012).  
My interest in Indonesia was initially sparked through backpacking around the 
beautiful far-stretched and diverse archipelago, while I studied half of my 
undergraduate degree in Peace and Conflict Studies at Gadjah Mada University 
(UGM), in Yogyakarta. While there, I interned at the Center for Security and Peace 
Studies at UGM and gained an increased understanding of many aspects of 
Indonesian culture and politics, as well as an intermediate proficiency in Bahasa 
Indonesia, which I would argue is indispensable in order to carry out fieldwork in 
Indonesia in a meaningful way. Language skills are also useful for internal 
                                                          
14 His publications in relation to issues discussed in this thesis: (Duncan 2014), (Duncan 2009), 
(Duncan 2008), (Duncan 2007), (Duncan 2007), (Duncan 2005), (Duncan 2005), (Duncan 2003), and 
(Duncan 2000). 
15 His publications related to this thesis: (Wilson 2015), (Wilson 2011), (Wilson 2008), (Wilson 
2006), (Wilson 2005), (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005), and (Wilson 2001).     
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evaluation of linguistic codes and expressions (Dulic 2011: 40). My bachelor’s 
thesis was also focused on the Moluccas, as I conducted in-depth interviews with 
Moluccan youths’ that had experienced the communal wars (Björkhagen 2013). My 
previous experience has aided the preparations for this study, and careful 
preparations are part of doing ethical research (Brydon 2006). Later during my 
current master programme, I was able to return for an internship at GRM 
International (now Palladium). Here, among many tasks, I had the opportunity to 
participate in two RCA studies—one pilot study on Java, and another in West 
Papua, focused on education.16  
After the internship I also worked as a consultant in another RCA study focused on 
perspectives and experiences of international migrant workers from Indonesian 
Borneo (The RCA+ Project Team 2015). Doing fieldwork always involves a range 
of complex ethical issues relating to ownership, exploitation and knowledge 
generation (Scheyvens, Storey 2003), and participatory fieldwork can be 
particularly difficult to carry out (Bell, Brambilla 2001). Here, I will address some 
important considerations in relation to the methods used in this study, where the 
overarching rule is to do no harm (and hopefully to do good)17 (Brounéus 2011: 
141, Momsen 2006: 47).  
This study’s overarching methodology aims to counter the tendency of mainstream 
development discourse that tends to legitimise the voices of Western ‘experts’, 
often at the expense of marginalised local voices (Escobar 1995). Apart from that, 
I took several actions to improve the ethical standard of the research. First, I always 
made it clear to all participants in the study that participation was completely 
voluntary and could be cancelled at any time. Second, for the interviews, the 
participants were told about the study by reading and signing an informed consent 
form, which was always verbally translated into Bahasa Indonesia, to avoid 
                                                          
16  This RCA study was commissioned by KIAT Guru and Analytical and Capacity Development 
Partnership (ACDP).  
17 For example, by giving voice to people who have largely been marginalised by the regime or 
neglected by previous research.    
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misunderstandings. Additionally, my interview guide and research aims were 
approved by my supervisor, as well as in general by Sida, in line with fulfilling the 
Minor Field Study (MFS) criteria. Third, full confidentiality was also an option for 
all respondents in the in-depth interviews.18 In RCA studies, the identities of the 
people and exact locations of the RCAs are always kept confidential. I acknowledge 
that this may reduce the general reliability of the methodology, yet, the ethical 
concerns (to protect the participants) are more 
important here. Storing the collected data in a secure 
way is also important, particularly when doing a study 
in a politically sensitive environment, containing 
confidential data19 (Höglund, Öberg 2011: 11).  
A risk assessment that identifies potential hazards and 
considers possible solutions if they occur, are also 
required before entering the field (Binns 2006: 16). 
This included a desk research of potential hazards (e.g., 
possible new outbreaks of violence, malaria, location of 
health facilities etc.). The malaria precautions proved 
necessary, as one member in my host household (HHH) in the Kao area 
unfortunately was infected during my stay, yet she was cured as treatment was 
provided quickly. I was caught in an ashfall from the active Dukono volcano in 
NHR. Fortunately for the study, this was in the very end of the fieldwork. However, 
I learned the hard way that volcanic ash may quickly spread hundreds of miles given 
strong wind, and inhaling even small parts of it can be hazardous20, as it contains 
tiny abrasive particles of rock and natural glass (Horwell, Baxter 2006). In a 
development perspective, volcanic activity is not only a threat to humans, but to 
livestock, (jet-driven) aircrafts, it may damage machines and electronics, as well as 
                                                          
18 Yet, nobody chose that option among the interviewees. 
19 I encrypted all files using the open source software Axantum AxCrypt. 
20 Subsequently, I developed respiratory pain and dizziness, and in Sweden I was diagnosed with 
possible pneumonia. This left me bedridden for some months and delayed the hand-in of this 
thesis. 
Dukono eruption seen from 
Tobelo.  
Photo: Martin Björkhagen  
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interrupting power generations (Horwell, Baxter 2006). In Indonesia, 69 million 
people live inside the risk area of 30 km distance to one of the 142 volcanoes 
(Preventionweb 2015). Another thing that is important to reflect about is the identity 
of the researcher, as the various perceptions of certain traits (e.g., gender, 
personality, age, class, ethnicity, nationality, religion, dress code etc.) may 
influence the actions and information shared by participants (Höglund 2011: 124). 
Further, in order to thwart hierarchical tendencies between the participants and 
myself, I followed the advice of Janet Henshall Momsen (2006: 47) who contends 
that constant reflexivity, along with continuous reassessments of one’s positionality 
and assumptions are required. During my fieldwork in NMP, I volunteered to teach 
English to local children in Ternate, which I found to be both fun and a chance to 
connect and give back to the community.  
4.2 A Qualitative Case Study 
In contrast to most previous studies regarding NMP, this study adopted a qualitative 
case study design, a methodology that is receptive to inter-disciplinary strategies 
(Wallensteen 2011: 17, Denscombe 2009: 43). This design acknowledges the 
complexity of conflicts and peace-building, paying attention to the contextual 
factors that are unique for each case, as opposed to the aim of finding commonalities 
to be compared between different cases. This design further permits different forms 
of data-collection that are useful for finding themes, patterns and for triangulating 
information, relating to the same case (Creswell 2012: 98).  
Another data-collection method I tried during the fieldwork was focus groups, 
which are conducive to exploring people’s experiences and opinions (Söderström 
2011: 147). This method was adopted once during the fieldwork, in relation to a 
Muslim youth organisation, but it turned out difficult to facilitate a meaningful 
discussion among the group, and instead it became more of a group interview. This 
was likely due to several reasons, partly due to my translator who was new to this 
method, and also due to cultural barriers, where some group members perhaps were 
hesitant to discuss potentially sensitive questions in the company of many people, 
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or with me, an outsider. Hence, the focus group data will not be included in the 
study, but it was nonetheless an experience to learn from. Other approaches could 
also have been interesting, for example using grounded theory. That approach aims 
to ‘move beyond description and to generate or discover a theory, a unified 
theoretical explanation for interactions, actions and social processes of people’ 
(Creswell 2012: 84). However, given the time-consuming inductive design required 
for grounded theory, the feasible choice was to combine the qualitative methods 
highlighted in the beginning of this section.             
4.3 RCA 
This section discusses the RCA methodology, including a contextual overview and 
the characteristics of the method. The end of the section highlights the RCAs in this 
study.21 
4.3.1 Contextual Overview 
Sida, on the initiative of the Swedish Embassy in Bangladesh, pioneered this 
experimental qualitative approach in Bangladesh, from 2007 to 2011 (Arvidson 
2013: 280). The RCA, and various other participatory approaches, for example 
Most Significant Change (MSC) (Davies, Dart 2005), Action Learning and 
Planning System (ALPS) (Aid 2006) and appreciative inquiry (Ludema, 
Cooperrider et al. 2006), have gained momentum over the last decades. This 
development can be viewed in the light of an increased conceptual objection 
towards the assumption that people living in poverty are powerless and lacking in 
initiative (Arvidson 2013: 280, Hulme 2004). Correspondingly, ‘bottom-up’ 
approaches have been increasingly promoted by donors and viewed as important in 
development planning (Momsen 2006: 49). These approaches focus on the agency 
of the beneficiaries and the importance (for practitioners and policy-makers) in 
development, to be in touch and up-to-date with the realities, contexts and 
                                                          
21  The RCA in Kao area was conducted 01.03.15-04.03.15 and the RCA in Tobelo area was 
conducted 05.03.15-08.03.15. 
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aspirations of people living in poverty, as these realities are dynamic and may 
change rapidly (EDG 2014: 4). However, the RCA is in general adopted as a tool 
within interdisciplinary and multi-methods approaches, in order to better respond 
to the great complexities that are intrinsic in processes of development and change 
over time; an example of this is the ‘Koshi Hills Study’ in Nepal, which used RCA, 
secondary data review, econometrics and Geographic Information System (GIS) 
(Koleros, Jupp et al. 2015). The preference of using the RCA as a component of a 
mixed methods approach hints at existing limitations of the method itself; if the aim 
is monitoring and evaluation, the RCA may lack sufficient breadth and will not 
generate findings that are generalizable (EDG 2014: 7). Yet, as this is well-known, 
the method is rarely adopted as a standalone evaluation method.            
4.3.2 Methodological Characteristics of the RCA 
In general, a researcher spends four consecutive days and nights in a HHH, where 
one interacts and explores the research theme, which also includes neighbouring 
households. An RCA study usually involves around 18 HHH and about 72 focal 
households (FHH) (neighbours) all together, as they are conducted by a team of 
researchers, as opposed to the RCAs in this study. Purposive sampling is used, in 
line with the aim of the particular study, to choose locations. In RCA, entering the 
community is done without gatekeepers and preferably by walking into the village 
(EDG 2014). This aims to promote independence and being unobtrusive, as well as 
to avoid ‘manipulation’ from different actors in a village (e.g., in selecting a HHH), 
and to reduce associations relating to outside interests.  
It is also important to be clear about that no resource mobilisation is involved, 
though the researchers are encouraged to discretely leave behind a bag of basic 
foodstuffs (e.g., rice, cooking oil etc.), in order to compensate for the food eaten 
while staying with the family (EDG 2014). There are a number of essential 
principles in RCA methodology that researchers and practitioners should follow 
both to improve the study and also to adhere to ethical standards (EDG 2014, 
Arvidson 2013). First, Living with instead of visiting, aiming at experiencing the 
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ordinary life of members in a household in an informal manner, trying to avoid a 
guest status. Thus, attention need to be directed at building rapport and maintaining 
good relationships involving sharing, self-disclosure and self-examination 
(Dickson-Swift, James et al. 2006: 856). Second, to have informal conversations, 
instead of formal interviews, to create a more relaxed atmosphere and to decrease 
power-distances—aiming to prevent polite but limited answers. Hence, RCA is 
sometimes linked to ‘listening studies’ and the notion of giving voice (Narayan, 
Patel et al. 1999). Yet, a thematic conversation guide including the themes of the 
study is often used discretely22, to aid practitioners (see Appendix E for the guide 
used in this study). Third, learning rather than finding out, aiming at suspending 
judgement and thereby giving agency to the people in the study, though, RCA is 
not action research. 
Fourth, being experiential in that practitioners actively immerse themselves in daily 
activities and accompany family members to, for example: school, the health clinic, 
work, market etc. This facilitates interaction and observation of different service 
providers and others, in the context of ordinary daily life routines. Fifth, embracing 
multiple realities as opposed to merely public consensus views and thus accepting 
a diversity and complexity of voices. Further, a cross-sectoral view is encouraged, 
rather than only focusing on one aspect of people’s lives.  
Sixth, flexibility of intra-method techniques are encouraged (e.g., observations, 
drama, drawing pictures and mapping, participatory video etc. Seventh, in general, 
RCA aims to be longitudinal in order to better understand and explore change over 
time. If the design is longitudinal, researchers will return to the same households, 
yearly, for five years. Eighth, awareness of power involves an aim to avoid 
displaying or using things that may widen pre-existing power gaps between the 
researcher and the people involved in the RCA (e.g., jewellery, expensive mobile 
phones/cameras/clothes/sunglasses/watches, using an umbrella to protect from the 
                                                          
22 I use to consult the guide when I am not engaged in conversations, e.g., before going to bed. 
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sun23, jokes between researcher-interpreter (as it excludes others) including talk in 
another language, as well as very formal language, dictating food preferences etc. 
Lastly, an important aspect is the triangulation opportunities inherent in RCA (e.g., 
between people, places and in time if longitudinal).                
4.3.3 The RCAs in This Study 
Two RCAs in this study were conducted in the Kao and Tobelo areas, in NHR (see 
Map 2). The motivations behind the choice of locations were presented in the 
introduction. This study has taken advantage of the experiential character in RCA’s 
methodology and therefore adapted the RCAs to fit the scope and aim of this thesis. 
Consequently, the RCAs in this study cannot be longitudinal, nor will they be 
centred around poverty (even though the HHHs were indeed poor). Instead, these 
RCAs explored ordinary people’s voices in regard to peace, development and 
reconciliation efforts, after the communal wars. The HHH I stayed with for this 
study fulfilled the broad criteria of being ordinary people who had experienced the 
conflicts and subsequent peace and reconciliation in the post-conflict era. I avoided 
to stay with the head of the village or other people with a power position. The HHHs 
in this study remain anonymous, as always within the RCA methodology.  Single 
RCAs have occurred in the past, often labelled as ‘pulse-takers’ (i.e. an update on 
context and development impacts etc.) (EDG 2014).  
An obvious limitation of the RCAs in this study is the lack of triangulation 
possibilities, compared to a ‘normal’ RCA study, where several researchers may 
triangulate findings from several HHH, in different locations. Nevertheless, the 
findings in this study will be triangulated with the data from the interviews and 
secondary sources, thus enabling inter-method triangulation. The time frame for 
both RCAs followed the ‘RCA standard’ of four days and nights in a row in each 
location, which were followed by a day of debriefing together with my interpreter. 
As Apentiik et al. stress, interpreters and research assistants can ‘make or break’ a 
                                                          
23 For example, in Indonesia, many people from the upper class use umbrellas for this purpose, to 
avoid getting tanned/darker, since being dark is associated with the lower class (manual workers), 
revealing a direct link between skin color and perception of class.  
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study (2006: 35). Accordingly, I was very privileged to have Siti Alifah Ahyar, an 
experienced and skilled interpreter who has conducted several RCAs, both as a 
researcher and as an interpreter. Since we had worked together before, we already 
had good rapport, which is important during the process of fieldwork.           
4.4 In-depth Interviews 
Nine in-depth interviews (see Appendix A) were conducted with members of the 
NMP elite and with respondents that can be categorised as ‘experts’, in relation to 
the research problem (sampling criteria are presented below). This method was 
adopted since it is a great tool to get a deeper understanding of complex processes 
in a post-conflict society (Brounéus 2011: 130). It can add insights to the case that 
would be hard to gain through quantitative methods. When using in-depth 
interviews, it is important to be consistent. For example, to explore the same general 
theme with all respondents, this improves the quality of the subsequent analysis. 
Having said that, it does not mean that every interview is the same; when using 
open-ended, semi-structured, questions, the respondent is given the choice of 
deciding the extent of each answer (Brounéus 2011: 130).  
This is part of the strength of this method, since it will contribute to a greater depth 
in the forthcoming analysis, where the respondents’ multiple views will be 
scrutinised (Esaiasson, Gilljam et al. 2007: 258). A limitation of this method can be 
said to be a lack of external validity, as the number of interviews are few, compared 
to questionnaires.    
4.4.1 Sampling, Validity and Reliability 
Purposeful sampling, or selective sampling, is a common and relevant sampling 
technique for qualitative case studies. Here, as Imelda Coyne suggests—the aims 
of the research should guide the sampling process (1997: 624). The process of 
choosing respondents (sampling) for in-depth interviews can be directed by the 
principle of credibility: ‘what sources will maximize the reliability and validity of 
the results’? (Rubin, Rubin 2005: 64). Since the number of respondents are few 
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(compared to a quantitative sample), it becomes increasingly important to find 
relevant persons. Since the RCA method is bottom-up (emic), (focused on societal 
motivations and the experiences of ordinary people), the in-depth interviews 
complement that perspective, as they capture the etic perspective. Previous research 
has concluded that many efforts (e.g., conflicts, peace-building and reconciliation) 
have been coordinated and organised by people from the local elite, at various levels 
in NMP: provincial, district or village (Van Klinken 2007).  
As the sample criteria was directed by the credibility principle, persons who were 
regarded as very knowledgeable and experienced in relation to the research 
problem, were also included in the in-depth interview sample, for example people 
from academia24, NGOs, CSOs and from the local media. I used gatekeepers to 
locate relevant people, according to the criteria discussed above and thus a couple 
of respondents were also located using snowball sampling. Nonetheless, they 
fulfilled the same criteria. Given their diversity, they did provide a great platform 
for exploring different voices of the etic perspective, as well as provided 
triangulation opportunities, in relation to the research problem. 
Validity and reliability are improved by being transparent about the different parts 
of the research process, as well as a reflection upon the researcher’s own position 
(see 4.4.1). Furthermore, a limitation of this design can be the lack of external 
validity (generalisations to other contexts). Nevertheless, qualitative methods do 
permit analytic generalisations (i.e., contribute/compare to new theory based on 
empirical findings, or through systematic analysis of the empirical data by utilising 
existing theories. Consequently, theory may render it possible to transfer 
understandings of qualitative knowledge from even a minor study, to other contexts 
(Bryman 2012: 191, Jönsson, Jerneck et al. 2012). Nonetheless, this method also 
has weaknesses relating to bias and reliability. For example, the researcher needs to 
                                                          
24 People within academia in Indonesia have often been reported to cooperate with elite politicians 
(e.g., encouraging their students to demonstrate in favour of certain politicians etc.) and they 
sometimes swap academia for formal political positions. Therefore, they can be included in the 
informal elite category (Barron, Azca et al. 2012).   
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critically assess if there are underlying reasons at play that guide the motivations of 
some respondents. Are there expectations of financial gains, or other reasons, 
stemming from the participation in an interview with a foreigner? The question of 
compensation is heavily debated within academia, and there is no easy answer 
(Brounéus 2011: 135). However, given the limited budget for this field study, the 
answer was easy due to practical reasons. I did also state that no compensation will 
be entitled to all interviewees verbally upon first contact, as well as written in the 
informed consent document, to avoid any misunderstandings.                   
4.4.2 Gatekeepers 
A gatekeeper(s) is another essential ingredient when doing in-depth interviews, 
especially when conducting research in politically sensitive environments. Without 
a gatekeeper, it may be impossible to get interviews with certain 
people/communities because a post-conflict period is usually characterised by 
issues such as power struggles within the political elite, corruption, sensitivities to 
outsiders based on historical events etc.  
In addition, gatekeepers can provide a smooth way of grounding the field research 
in the local community, as it may help establishing good rapport and trust with the 
local people, and he or she may also make sure that the research questions make 
sense in that particular local context (Brounéus 2011: 134), however, an informal 
method as RCA does not use gatekeepers (see 4.3). I can confirm the importance of 
working with gatekeepers, as I did for the in-depth interviews during my fieldwork 
in NMP. My main gatekeeper is a native of North Maluku and has experience of 
working with humanitarian assistance after the conflicts for UNDP, and now works 
as a civil servant in the provincial government. This background provides him with 
an in-depth understanding of the issues relating to this thesis, as well as an extensive 
contact network. Therefore, it would have been very difficult, or impossible, to 
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know who to interview and to actually get in contact with all those local elite 
interviewees, without the cooperation and knowledge of the gatekeeper.25                          
4.4.3 Conducting In-depth Interviews 
The schedule for the in-depth interviews in this thesis can be found in Appendix A. 
The majority of the interviews were conducted in Ternate and the rest in Tobelo. 
Ternate is the locus of politics in NMP, and Tobelo is the capital of NHR, which 
experienced the most intense communal conflict. Therefore, these towns are home 
to most influential people in relation to my research problem, in the etic perspective. 
There are several things to consider when conducting in-depth interviews. First, the 
place and atmosphere must ensure that the interviewees’ feel comfortable and safe. 
If not, the information gained will suffer and the ethical standards of the research 
as well. Second, it is pivotal that the researcher has reflective listening skills, which 
lead to a better understanding of the respondent; this shows that you are an emphatic 
listener, which further entails an ethical judgement of knowing when to stop asking 
about potential traumatic issues etc. (Brounéus 2011: 137). In the light of this, I 
made a habit of always talking with the respondents beforehand, to let them 
influence the place and setting of the subsequent interview, as well as letting them 
have a look at the interview guide and/or ask any questions about the aim of the 
research. As a result, the interviews were conducted in a variety of venues, but 
having in common that they were places chosen by the respondents. The same 
interview guide (see Appendix B) was used, however, the length of the interviews 
varied considerably, which displays that each interview is still different in many 
ways. Lastly, I incorporated some lessons from interactional sociolinguistics that 
include a focus stretching beyond spoken words (e.g. eye rolls, body language, 
pauses and hesitations). This facilitates an interpretation of what the respondent 
intended to say and perhaps how sensitive the issue was, rather than simply what 
he/she said (Holmes 2008: 372).              
                                                          
25 He remains anonymous for ethical reasons. I got in touch with him through contacts obtained 
during my internship at GRM.  
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4.5 E-mail Interviews 
The in-depth interviews were complemented with two email interviews with two 
experienced researchers (see 4.1.1) in relation to my research area. On the one hand, 
compared to in-depth interviews, this method lacks the possibilities of incorporating 
the interactional sociolinguistic elements (mentioned above), and thus it may be 
harder to establish rapport etc. On the other hand, others stress that email interviews 
may stimulate a more egalitarian form of interview, since it is absent of visual cues 
and thus might reduce some prejudice. They also provide greater flexibility, and 
privacy, where a respondent may answer in their own time (Desai, Potter 2006). 
4.6 Assessment of Secondary Sources 
Secondary sources have been used as a complement to the primary sources. The 
secondary sources include previous research in relation to the research problem and 
relevant historical, political and background information. That may be from 
academic journals, books, reports by INGOs, CSOs, NGOs etc. I have used these 
sources for several purposes, for example to identify actors/organisations relevant 
for the study, identifying research gap(s), learn relevant theory, understanding 
conflict trajectories, and as a way to triangulate the findings from this study. 
Secondary sources, just like primary sources, are in need of critical assessment, 
sometimes referred to as an external evaluation. I followed the suggestions provided 
by Tomislav Dulic (2011: 38-39), when I evaluated the sources for this study.  
4.7 Analysing Qualitative Data 
I have chosen a thematic analysis in relation to the qualitative data in this study, 
which should be seen as part of a holistic design that stresses the importance of not 
isolating parts of social realities. Thus, social realities are best understood if 
examined contextually (Lincoln, Guba 1985: 39). Initial steps in the analytical 
process included transcriptions of all interviews and discussing and writing down 
themes and findings of the RCAs while debriefing with my interpreter. Further steps 
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include identifying commonalities and differences, as well as reoccurring themes 
or trends throughout and across the data. Here, the guiding principle was to identify 
themes of importance in relation to the aim and objectives of the study (Guest, 
MacQueen et al. 2011: 67). The last part of the analysis was to also look for more 
abstract themes and thus to analyse the findings using the conceptual framework in 
the study. Final interpretations and discussions of this analysis will be presented in 
Chapter 5. The analytical process is aided by triangulation with secondary sources 
to facilitate a meaningful discussion and validation of the results (Creswell, Clark 
2007: 129).    
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5 Results and Analysis  
 
In this chapter, the findings from the primary and secondary sources will be 
systematically analysed in relation to the stated research questions, where the 
conceptual framework will provide the lens needed to make sense of the findings.  
5.1 The Influence of Colonial Legacies and Neo-patrimonialism 
The initial question to be discussed is in what ways the communal wars were 
influenced by colonial legacies, and subsequently follows a discussion regarding 
neo-patrimonial impacts in NMP.  
5.1.1 Colonial Legacies 
In a European perspective, the Moluccas was arguably more famous in the past, 
where it was known as the Spice Islands. This eastern part of the vast Indonesian 
archipelago has lured traders for more than 700 years, mainly in search of nutmeg, 
mace and clove, which were endemic to the Moluccas and highly valued as 
preservatives before the age of refrigerators (Bräuchler 2015). Prior to the arrival 
of the European colonial powers, the region was caught up by the rivalries between 
the main political centres: the Sultanates of Tidore and Ternate. 26  
When the European colonial powers arrived, they entered the domain of hegemonic 
Islam, as gradual conversions had been occurring ever since the establishment of 
the first Arab trading colonies in the China Sea, as early as the seventh century 
(Wolf, Eriksen 2010, Taylor 2003). Yet, by the end of the 17th Century, the Dutch 
became the most powerful force, ousting the rival Portuguese, Spanish and British 
colonisers. The most powerful company was by far the Dutch East India Company 
(Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, (VOC). They made so much profit from 
                                                          
26 The two other sultanates are Bacan and Jailolo, all in today’s NMP, however, they have remained 
much less influential, compared to Ternate and Tidore.  
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the monopolisation of spices, mainly in the Moluccas, that they paid their 
stockholder an average of 18 percent per year between (1602-1800), however, it 
eventually ended in bankruptcy and a subsequent hand-over of authority of the 
Indies to the Dutch crown in 1800 (Li 2007: 32-33).27 In the Moluccas, divisions of 
the local populations along religious lines was a direct consequence of colonial rule, 
as Catholic and Protestant missionaries often followed the colonial ventures and 
dividing the local population was a common trait of colonial rule (Brown, Wilson 
et al. 2005: 10). Christian converts were treated superior, compared to followers of 
local animist religions, or local converts to Islam.  
For example, the Dutch colonisers only deemed the Christians converts worthy of 
the white man’s burden to be ‘improved’. Consequently, the Dutch administration 
allowed these converts to receive education, which was denied to Muslims and 
followers of local animist cosmologies. Although Muslims and Christians have for 
the most part lived in peaceful co-existence, colonial rule had created an evident 
social stratification along religious, commercial and factional lines; a process 
initiated already in the 1650s (Bertrand 2004). However, as elaborated on in the 
conceptual framework, the Dutch still carefully maintained the notion of the 
natives’ ‘otherness’ even to converts, in order to legitimise their rule, which is 
evident by the adherence of separate legal systems (Li 2007: 32).  
Furthermore, as conceptualised in Chapter 3, a common colonial tactic was also to 
reinforce local elite rulers, in order to control populations indirectly. In NMP, 
various colonial powers used this tactic and thus took sides in the long-standing 
rivalry between different sultans in the regions, which shows that the Islamic elite 
were not treated as the general population. Yet, this was only because the colonisers 
considered these alliances and indirect rule advantageous for extracting the natural 
resources, where the overarching aim always was to monopolise the spice trade (Li 
2007). The colonial powers also manipulated geographical borders to serve their 
interests, as was mentioned as a common colonial trait in Chapter 3. In NMP, this 
                                                          
27 For a visual map displaying the Dutch East India expansion, see; 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dutch_East_Indies_Expansion.gif   
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manipulation is still dividing the island of Ternate into one ‘traditional’ area loyal 
to the Sultan of Ternate, and the rest as a more cosmopolitan and Islamic part, where 
several different ethnic groups and newcomers to the area often reside; since the 
Dutch had always only allowed newcomers to settle in that area (Van Klinken 2007: 
114). Accordingly, the communal war in Ternate between the Sultan of Ternate’s 
Pasukan Kuning and the Muslim Pasukan Putih, has clear connections to the 
artificial geographical boundaries created by the Dutch and Spanish colonisers, as 
they had formed competing alliances with the local elites.     
Inter-group horizontal inequalities are often sources of tensions that may cause 
violence, especially if changes occur rapidly—and this also include changes that 
even out pre-existing inequalities (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005). This is exactly what 
happened in the Moluccas prior to the communal wars. In a period of six years 
(1991-1997), the local Christian economic and socio-political domination in the 
Moluccas was eroding, in line with General Suharto’s ‘Islamic turn’, as can be 
exemplified by the following tables (which also reveal effects relating to 
transmigration). 
Table 1 
 
 
 
  
Calculated from sample of Census 1990. The numbers cover what is 
today’s MP and NMP, as it was prior to the split. Figures in bold are 
above province average (Brown, Wilson, et al. 2005: 27).  
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Table 2 
 
 
Religion is important for the vast majority of the population and thus has a great 
influence for the social networks of many people. This is further confirmed by the 
empirical data from my fieldwork, where the majority of the respondents usually 
identified themselves first and foremost based on religious identity, and often 
ethnicity and other factors as secondary. Yet, some people in Tobelo and even more 
in Kao, emphasised ethnicity before religious identity, as exemplified by the Kao 
Muslims, who pointed out that one should say ‘Kao Muslim, and not Muslim Kao’ 
(RCA in Kao, 2015).  
Another observation I made, however, was the almost complete segregation of the 
religious communities still today. Often people of different religions live in separate 
villages, or as segregated neighborhoods within a town.28 The segregation is further 
evident within the educational system, where the majority of the private schools are 
religiously segregated, from kindergarten to universities, yet, public schools are 
often mixed. Nevertheless, some policy changes are going on in Ternate, as students 
from different faiths are being accepted to schools of another religion now more 
                                                          
28 An exception being the few returning Christian IDPs in Ternate, who are mixed throughout the 
city (Interview Theis Hoke, 2015).   
Calculated from the Demographic Health Surveys 
(Brown, Wilson, et al. 2005: 27).  
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often than in the past (interviews with Theis Hoke and Kasman Hi Ahmad, 2015). 
Yet, students are always only taught religion based on their own religion, thus not 
learning about other faiths at all in school. The Moluccas has often been mentioned 
as a place of harmony between religions, and religious violent conflicts have indeed 
been rare. However, as Birgit Bräuchler (2015: 59) argues: ‘…interreligious 
relationships were based on passive tolerance, and interreligious dialogue was 
missing’. This is part of why religion later became one of the mobilising forces in 
the communal wars, sometimes labelled an ‘enabling environment’, referring to the 
segregation and horizontal inequalities along religious (and ethnic lines). To 
conclude this section, I argue that the above analysis has exposed that several of the 
general traits of colonial rule have indeed influenced the Moluccan society and 
created divisions of the local population along factional (Ternate-Tidore) and 
religious lines in general, where the evident social stratification between local 
Christians and Muslims is heavily influenced by colonial legacies. 
5.1.2 Neo-patrimonial Impacts 
The general characteristics and common consequences of neo-patrimonialism have 
been conceptualised in Chapter 3.1.2. Some of these concerns are intertwined with 
the decentralisation process and will thus be further analysed below, others will be 
dealt with here. The communal war between the ethnic Makians and Kaos, was to 
a large extent driven by an increased Kao frustration over a corrupt district 
government.  
First, the government had refused to take their voices into account regarding the 
establishment of the Sub-district of Malifut, which boundaries included two 
traditional Kao villages, as well as the Gosowong gold mine. The straw that broke 
the camel’s back was when the Makian-dominated provincial government later 
refused to compensate the Kaos’ for the destruction of these two villages by the 
Makians, which made it clear that the government was far from impartial. Rather, 
it was suffering from a classic symptom of neo-patrimonialism: a governance 
structure permeated by corruption by local elites in relation to state assets, by the 
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means of bureaucracy and companies in control of the state. Here, the gold mine, 
although not state-controlled, raised the stakes, as it would still generate significant 
taxes to the local regency government 29 , and provide plenty of employment 
opportunities. To be fair, these concerns were also coupled with emotional factors, 
as the Makians’ did feel that they had legitimate land-rights, since they had been 
re-located there by the national government. Nonetheless, the neo-patrimonial traits 
of the Makian-elite paved way for the macro foundations directly related to the 
subsequent outbreak of violence, as their main focus was to reinforce their own 
position, which evidently became a great obstacle to a peaceful resolution to the 
Kao-Makian conflict, as well as development in general, in the whole Kao-Malifut 
area. Neo-patrimonialism and its related power and patronage opportunities, are in 
theory often contributing to an inefficient development ideology as well as 
communal ethno-religious tensions (Wilson 2008: 70, Wilson 2015: 3, Bertrand 
2002: 58).  
That would be an understatement in this case, where it is better understood as 
having contributed to the chaos and destruction of ethnicity-based communal war, 
which subsequently sparked religious war in almost every corner of NMP. After the 
communal wars, the government’s response did contain more pragmatism, as 
building material for the reconstruction of the burned Kao villages were provided, 
however, the material was often not sufficient (RCA Kao area, 2015). Thus, many 
Kaos are still disappointed about the provincial government’s (in)actions, which is 
further exacerbated by the fact that Malifut Sub-district never was revoked. Yet, the 
disappointments are unlikely to erupt in new clashes with the Makians, as people 
realised that violence did not contribute to a sustainable solution, rather it caused 
severe destruction and trauma. Relations with the Makians have gradually improved 
as well (ibid.). The profits of NHM’s gold mine is still largely benefitting the 
Australian majority owner company Newcrest. Yet, the taxes and employment have 
not only benefitted the Makians, as the Kao previously feared. Instead the Regency 
                                                          
29 The Kaos feared that Malifut could later become the capital of the forthcoming North Halmahera 
Regency, which involve significant rent-making opportunities for neo-patrimonial elites.  
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of North Halmahera is at the receiving end of tax revenues and permit deals. This 
has led to mixed feelings amongst the Kao (and Malifut groups). On the one hand, 
there are people from both ethnic groups that have been able to work in the NHM 
goldmine, which give high salaries and pensions. Some have even got positions in 
the NHM’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee, which are in 
command of distributing money to the NHM community development programme, 
aimed to reach the five sub-districts in closest proximity of the mine.  
Yet, during my fieldwork, tensions were apparent in both Kao and Tobelo (where 
the regency government offices are), as demonstrators took to the streets, 
demanding transparency and results regarding the promise of the one percent of the 
company’s yearly revenues (approximately 100 billion Rp.) that have been 
earmarked for community development in the five sub-districts. Demonstrators 
claim that the only results so far are a village gate and a number of scholarships. 
The local press reports that only 15 billion rupiah (Rp.) have benefitted the local 
communities, which leaves 85 percent stolen on a yearly basis (Seputar Malut 
2015). It is further reported that the police investigation focuses on people within 
the regency government and the CSR committee, but no arrests have ever been 
made (ibid.). The CSR committee itself and NHM, have refused to comment on the 
case (RCA Kao area, 2015).  
The official I interviewed in the regency government blamed the entire problem on 
the NHM, for lacking in transparency towards the local people (Interview with M 
Roke Saway, Tobelo 2015). Many local demonstrators have placed their hopes for 
a thorough investigation by the national corruption eradication commission (KPK), 
but so far waiting in vain. Locals, together with environmental and indigenous 
rights NGOs, have previously demonstrated in the thousands against NHM’s 
destruction of 52 hectares of protected forest in connection to their second mine 
site, in the Toguraci area, which put spokes in the wheels for the livelihoods of 
indigenous people in both Kao and Malifut. NHM’s operations is said to violate the 
Law No. 41/2003 on mining in protected areas, yet a court decision has later 
allowed the company to operate (Jakarta Post 2003). The company has hired 
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soldiers and police for security, who intimidates and denies entry for the local 
people (Jakarta Post 2003). To sum up, it can be said that the developments after 
the communal wars in Kao-Malifut have largely normalised relations between the 
former conflicting groups. Yet, it seems likely that the corruption of the community 
development money can partly be connected to neo-patrimonial features of the elite 
in the regency government (Kabupaten Halmahera Utara), as well as by locals 
connected to the CSR committee—and this is indeed creating new frictions in the 
affected societies today.    
5.2 Impacts of Decentralisation in NMP 
This section will shed light on the various outcomes related to the decentralisation 
processes initiated soon after the fall of the Suharto regime. The analysis will first 
briefly present how these policies came about on a national level, and later follows 
an analysis regarding the impacts on the communal wars in NMP. The last part will 
look at how the peace-building process was affected by these policies.     
5.2.1 Decentralisation and the Communal Wars 
After the fall of Suharto, among the first priorities in the political transition from 
autocracy to democracy, was to initiate decentralisation and regional autonomy 
processes. B.J. Habibie, Suharto’s successor, started the democratisation and 
decentralisation processes by reducing the military’s power in politics and 
establishing freedom of the press (HD Centre, LIPI & Current Asia 2011: 10). He 
also announced the first democratic elections after Suharto, which ended his own 
presidency. Thus, in 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as ‘Gus Dur’, 
became the first democratically elected president after the long autocratic rule. 30 
The democratisation and decentralisation processes continued with the passing of 
several new laws in 1999—UU No. 22/1999 on the devolution of political authority 
                                                          
30 He was removed by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and replaced by Vice-president 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, who then acted as president 2001-2004. She was succeeded by Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), who got re-elected a second term and was succeeded by the current 
President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo in the 2014 election.  
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and UU No. 25/1999 on fiscal decentralisation (Bräuchler 2015: 41). Nonetheless, 
it was not until 2001 that the government launched the full programme of 
decentralisation, often referred to as ‘big bang’ decentralisation (Smith 2009). The 
name indicates that the reforms were quite radical changes of the governance 
structure, as it involved a rapid transformation of economic and political policy 
linked to the former long authoritarian centralised governance structure (Hofman 
2003). Decentralisation efforts were undertaken in many Southeast Asian countries, 
often enthusiastically supported by multi-lateral institutions such as the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (WB), yet, Indonesia’s 
development was one of the most extreme regarding its pace and extent (Duncan 
2007: 713).    
In light of Timor Leste’s secession from Indonesia (largely seen as an aberration in 
Indonesia), the new laws were also carefully drafted in order to prevent further 
provinces to follow the path of seeking independence from Indonesia (Smith 2009). 
The anti-secession aim became a common denominator for both the hardliners 
(aiming for increased central government control and a strong military in conflict 
areas) and reformers (aiming for greater regional/local government autonomy) 
(Smith 2009a). Key issues for both parties were to manage conflicts and continue 
democratisation, meanwhile retaining the current national boundaries of the 
Republic of Indonesia.  
Secession-risks were thought to be lower if minority groups, or other marginalised 
groups, could get increased participation and be included into politics. For example 
by bringing control of resources, public service delivery and other government 
bureaucracy tasks, closer to the local populations and thus hopefully increase 
support for the central government at the same time. Therefore, greater autonomy 
and resources were focused on the lower administrative divisions of kabupaten 
(regencies), kota (cities), and desa (villages), instead of directly to higher level 
provinsi (province) (Bräuchler 2015). Correspondingly, direct democratic elections 
were introduced to elect heads for local governments, i.e. gubernor (governor of a 
province), bupati (regency head), and walikota (mayor), for the first time in 
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Indonesia (HD Centre, LIPI & Current Asia 2011: 11). On the one hand, these 
decentralisation policies can be considered as democratic progressions in the reform 
era. As was highlighted in Chapter 3, in theory, decentralisation is supposed to 
foster good governance, as it creates incentives for local officials to be more 
responsive to local aspirations, as community participation should increase (Ribot 
2004). On the other hand, critics have stressed that, decentralisation also involves 
great challenges, such as risks of increased competition and corruption among local 
elites, as power is swiftly decentralised in their favor, without a fine print for 
monitoring all sufficient regulations and anti-corruption measures (Van Klinken 
2007).    
The latter is a more valid description in relation to NMP. Initially, many aspects of 
the decentralisation process provoked a lack of clarity within the governance 
structure, as the new divisions of power between local, district and provincial 
government was still relatively ambiguous. Thus, this strongly affected the co-
ordination between these governments in a time of erupting tensions (HD Centre, 
LIPI & Current Asia 2011). In the case of NMP, the critics concerns were often 
justified. One of the main conflicting points between the Makians and the Kaos, 
was the ethnic Makians’ successful lobby for a new sub-district in Malifut, 
incorporating the Gosowong gold mine, and two traditional Kao villages (Brown, 
Wilson et al. 2005: 30-31).  
Here, it would be naïve to exclude the decentralisation process as a factor 
contributing to the rising tensions between these ethnic groups, especially since the 
argument literally involved a dispute about boundaries of the newly established 
kecamatan Malifut. The findings from the RCA (2015) in the Kao-area, are also 
interesting. The majority did not mention the decentralisation process as having had 
a significant influence for the communal wars and the gold mine was not mentioned 
as a reason that increased competition. The opinion that the conflict was not about 
religion was also wide-spread in the Kao area. Nonetheless, the demonstrations (in 
2015) against the alleged corruption regarding the revenues for community 
development from the gold mine, reveals that resources do matter, yet, as one of 
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many factors. It is also likely that people are reluctant to highlight monetary gains 
as a motive, since it can make you ‘lose face’ if you appear driven by financial 
greed. In Ternate, the competition among different factions amongst the provincial 
elite was even more evident. Perhaps unsurprisingly, only one of the interviewees, 
Roswita Mubin Abow (interview Ternate, 2015), argued that the decentralisation 
process was a contributing factor for the outbreak of the communal wars, as it ‘was 
a very uncertain time that became a hard process for some people, separating some 
people from others’.  
Here, it should be noted that she uses very diplomatic terms (i.e. separating and 
hard process), when in fact she is talking about groups clashing in a communal war, 
where people eventually killed their former neighbours in the streets, often using 
spears and machetes. As was discussed in Chapter 4 regarding the adoption of 
interactional sociolinguistics, Abow’s words, in my interpretation, illustrate a 
lingering taboo, in relation to discussing the brutality, and culpability, in relation to 
the brutal communal war. That the violence was in general considered taboo, 
particularly to discuss its details, was a general impression throughout the 
fieldwork. The exceptions being a few victims, for example a woman who had been 
widowed and lost a son in the wars, who voluntarily accounted for how a massacre 
had happened in her village (RCA Tobelo area, 2015).  
The fact that no other interviewee within the elite wanted to acknowledge the 
intense competition between the Ternate elite factions, is perhaps also quite telling, 
since it likely involves a degree of collective guilt, judging of the consequences it 
was part of creating. In the e-mail interview with scholar Chris Wilson (07.06.15), 
he argues that it is hard to judge how decentralisation has affected the 
peacebuilding, ‘but it certainly affected the chances of war initially’. To conclude, 
the above analysis has found that in the case of NMP, the rapid decentralisation, did 
not unfold in line with good governance, as the proponents of decentralisation argue 
(see 3.3). Instead, the sudden changes, lead to intense competition among different 
elite factions, most evidently in Ternate, were a communal clash between the Sultan 
of Ternate’s allies, and his Tidore/Makian opponents, ended up with the defeat of 
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the Sultan’s Pasukan Kuning. Ethnic, and later religious, identities had been 
gradually politicised, in order to mobilise people. Yet, importantly, these factors 
have to be considered in relation to other structural transitions or reforms occurring 
simultaneously, such as the transition from autocracy to democracy, as well as 
fundamental reforms of the security forces, the judiciary and corporate governance 
(Brown, Wilson et al. 2005). A contributing factor is also the legacy of Suharto’s 
long regime, where the important, but difficult, process of institutional-building was 
not high on the agenda.    
5.2.2 Decentralisation and Peace-building 
The decentralisation process was not altogether negative for NMP. After the 
communal wars, the decentralisation process, and especially the making of new 
administrative districts pemekaran, did have a positive impact in the post-conflict 
period, as was also confirmed above (interview Chris Wilson, 07.06.15). Scholar 
Christopher Duncan agrees as well: 
I would argue at the most basic level that the amount of money that the local governments can 
make from various initiatives due to decentralization has played a role in maintaining the 
peace. There is simply too much money to be made these days to let the violence happen again 
(e-mail interview, 10.06.15).   
The respondents’ views were mixed in relation to this topic. A few maintained that 
there were no major connections between decentralisation and peace-building. Still, 
most stressed that it had had positive impacts. During the interviews, the 
conversations on this topic at times also involved reconciliation, as this was brought 
up by many respondents here. For example by Ishak Naser (24.02.05):  
Decentralisation might have some influence in terms of speeding up the peace-building 
process because it gave a number of authorities to the local government to carry out their 
programs in a more flexible way, but again I think there were no direct relation between the 
decentralisation and reconciliation. It only worked in terms of increasing the efficiency in 
tackling down the conflict issue.   
Roswita Mubin Abow (28.02.15) was the respondent most in favour of 
decentralisation, as she contended that it had a positive impact on the society, as it 
transferred authority towards the local people that can empower communities. This 
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is thus in line with the arguments for decentralisation, as presented in Chapter 3. 
Abow, who had worked for UNDP in the immediate post-conflict period, also 
stressed the importance of INGOs in supporting this process. In the interview with 
Husen Alting (28.02.15), he also used reconciliation synonymously with peace-
building, and further agreed that it had been good for the reconciliation process. 
Kasman Hi Ahmad (21.02.15) also made that connection, arguing that the 
decentralisation was used as a tool for different ways of reconciliation, in different 
levels of authority, such as provincial, regency and sub-district levels. Zadrak 
Tongo-Tongo (09.03.15) provided the most interesting insight perhaps, capturing 
the elite perception of pemekaran, in relation to the decentralisation process, which 
was controlled from national level. He contended that since the year 2000, they 
[Tobelo elite] were introduced to the central government’s plans to introduce 
pemekaran as soon as possible in relation to NMP, which aimed to create a more 
autonomous regency [NHR], to make the conflict issues be solved faster.  
According to Tongo-Tongo, this policy was very well received, in his opinion, and 
people united and worked together to convince the central government to speed up 
the process. The positive receptions of most respondents have to be viewed in light 
of how the communal wars ended, with a stalemate between the two major sides: 
The Muslim forces could not defeat the Christians in Kao and Tobelo, and vice 
versa regarding the Muslim strongholds in Ternate/Tidore. This was coupled with 
widespread conflict fatigue given the immense cost it had inflicted and a general 
eroding of people’s support for the involved political elite factions (Barron, Azca 
et al. 2012). The opinion that people was tired of fighting, and particularly weary 
of manipulation from political elite and/or provocateurs (often directed at rogue 
elements in the military or outside elite) was part of the findings in both RCA 
locations. Therefore, the incentives and possibilities to use violence as a means for 
elite agendas faded away. The process of pemekaran, which in NMP involved 
(apart from the initial creation of NMP) the creation of four additional regencies, 
with Ternate and Tidore in addition, as self-ruling cities with mayors (walikota). 
Furthermore, each regency was at this time also divided into plenty more kecamatan 
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(sub-districts). Today NMP consists of 45 kecamatan that are further divided into 
730 kelurahan/desa (villege-level). Important here was that funds from the central 
government would now in many cases surpass the provincial level, under the law 
UU. 1/2003 (Barron, Azca et al. 2012: 75). This meant that resources were abundant 
and widespread, and not as concentrated at the provincial level as in 1999. 
Furthermore, pemekaran ensured that this development was steady (e.g., resources 
were not limited to temporary post-conflict recovery allocations) and there were 
lots of new civil servant positions to be filled, which are in general the most popular 
employments in the Moluccas, as it generates comparatively high salaries (and 
status), coupled with pensions, which is a rarity in Indonesia.  
With the acceptance of NHR as a regency with Tobelo as its capital, the Christian 
elites had been separated from the Muslim elites in Ternate/Tidore, and thus the 
incentives for elite competition diminished. Taking NHR as an example, the 
regency received 1,66 trillion Rp. (US$ 170 million) from 2005-2009. A significant 
amount considering the regency population (171,000 in 2003) and a huge difference 
from the amounts received in the past, at the local administrative level (Barron, 
Azca et al. 2012: 75).  
Among the respondents, Zadrac Tongo-Tongo and Mahmud Adi, were both 
actively involved in the violence. The former as a conflict leader within Pasukan 
Merah, the latter as agas fighter in Pasukan Putih. In relation to the discussion 
above, they exemplify that most fighters in the conflict, were successfully de-
radicalised in the post-conflict period, partly thanks to the new opportunities created 
regarding employment and civil servant positions, in relation to decentralisation 
and pemekaran. Tongo-Tongo became a member of the provincial parliament in 
2004, and Adi is a lecturer at Khairun University. The prime example though, is 
Abdul Gani Kasuba, the current Governor of NMP, previously a Muslim preacher 
who organised the recruitment and transportation of jihadists to fight in Tobelo, as 
well as Wahdah Zainal Imam (organiser of the anti-Christian riots in Ternate) who 
became part of the legislature in Ternate 2004 (Barron, Azca et al. 2012). The 
empirical findings from both RCA locations, in general, support the view that 
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pemekaran did have a positive influence for the peace-building, as it ‘made the sub-
districts grow up’ so they could help solve the problems quickly. Some persons 
mentioned the visit by former President Megawati, as a positive sign that 
demonstrated that also the central government cared about a solution to the wars 
(RCA Tobelo area, 2015). Yet, others remained critical towards most of the central 
governments’ actions, as they argued that they had not cared about the people in the 
Moluccas, until in the very end. The same persons often highlighted that, despite 
decentralisation and pemekaran, the central government still deployed military 
personnel from outside the province, which often did more bad than good for the 
local communities. A theme that united almost everyone in both RCA locations, 
was that the efforts from the various governments, were less influential compared 
to the grassroots initiatives throughout NMP, in relation to the building peace (an 
argument further developed in Chapter 5.4).  
Lastly, the Kaos’ demonstrations against alleged corruption of community 
development funds (see 5.1.2), were partly directed against their regency 
government in Tobelo, which is dominated by the ethnic Tobelos (the Kaos allies 
in the communal wars) (RCAs Kao and Tobelo areas, 2015). The problems here 
regarding corruption and continued political marginalisation of the Kaos, can be 
interpreted in line with the arguments presented by Resosudarmo (2004) and Hadiz 
(2004), (see 3.3), that regional and local elites have a tendency to easily get 
corrupted, when power dynamics change rapidly in their favour, which can result 
in (continued) marginalisation and exclusion of certain minority groups. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence from the RCA studies indicate that Ribot’s 
(2004) argument that regional elites sometimes only remain accountable towards 
majority groups, as they are the important group to nurture to win the next 
democratic election, and thus care less for the minorities, like the Kaos.         
5.3 The Effects of Illiberal Peace-building 
Indonesia, after the fall of the New Order regime, can be argued to have ended up 
in a contested political environment, somewhere in between autocracy and 
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democracy, hence in a hybrid political order, as  the Indonesian central government 
quickly introduced ambitious reforms of most sectors (as discussed in previous 
parts of the thesis). At the same time as this difficult transition commenced, 
Indonesia faced several uprisings and communal conflicts, which made ‘experts’ to 
predict an imminent Balkanisation of Indonesia (Smith 2009). In order to 
circumvent such a disastrous development (in the perspective of the Indonesian 
state), the central government adopted a number of illiberal means to prevent this, 
as it realised it was suffering from the ‘dual dilemma’ of democratisation (i.e., 
increased pressures among powerful actors over positions/resources, while not yet 
having built sustainable democratic institutions to manage such disputes) 
(Mansfield, Snyder 1995, Smith 2009).  
In the case of NMP, the ambitious reforms, and particularly decentralisation, had 
contributed to the communal violence, instead of decreasing it (see 5.2.1). 
Furthermore, as Smith (2014: 1514) contends, all actors within the GoI wanted to 
avoid any further secession, as was happening with Timor Leste.  It is in this light 
we must consider the actions of the GoI to issue the status of civil emergency (see 
Chapter 2) that (temporarily) gave back significant powers to the security forces in 
NMP. This can thus be one example of an illiberal/autocratic mean to solve 
conflicts, which had been the (only) way the Suharto regime approached conflicts 
(Bertrand 2004). Then, how was this move received by the local elites’ vis-à-vis at 
grassroots level? One of the Christian elite leaders, Zedrak Tongo-Tongo, argued 
that the military approach in NMP, involved both positive and negative impacts. 
An example of the former was that the military had helped facilitate the early peace-
meetings (see Chapter 2.1.4), Tongo-Tongo stressed (09.03.15):  
The Muslim people had taken the initiative to ask the military to be a facilitator [for peace-
meetings]. The Muslim leaders had demanded to meet the Christian leaders and talk about the 
conflict. We [the Christian leaders] needed to discuss their demand first, we had a bit of 
negative thinking about it because they had involved the military to facilitate the meeting. We 
were worried it was a trap. Especially as the meeting was on the border between Galela and 
Tobelo, in the Mamuya village [border between Christians and Muslims after the stalemate]. 
But we agreed to think positively and we agreed to meet them in Mamuya village.   
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TNI had also helped escort the first visit by Muslim leaders to the (Christian) City 
of Tobelo, which Tongo-Tongo (09.03.15) described as having a positive impact in 
the community, as Tongo-Tongo and other Christian leaders escorted the Muslim 
leaders, and thus demonstrated cooperation and trust between the two former enemy 
sides in NHR. Such actions by the military were well received by most locals, also 
at the grassroots (RCA Tobelo area, 2015).  
A finding from the RCA in Kao area, (2015), was that people there, in general, 
highlighted that the military units consisting of soldiers from outside the Moluccas 
had been ‘good’, while local units had, sometimes, made situations worse. When 
asked what had been positive with the work of the TNI, most people mentioned 
evacuation of IDPs (RCA Kao area, 2015). The reinforced military deployments 
meant that the TNI now could effectively separate the two conflicting sides, which 
they did using blockades that restricted movements in NHR for over a year, which 
prevented further clashes (Smith 2014). Yet, during both the interviews with the 
elite, as well as the RCAs, most people still have a negative view of the security 
forces overall. Here, Tongo-Tongo, exemplifies a commonly held frustration 
towards the security forces: 
I have asked Kapolres [police unit in kecamatan] as the conflict just happened from a point in 
the village which was not far from their office, just like 100 meters away approximately, and 
the police should have power because they had 72 troops and TNI had a company. Why did 
they not do anything and instead let the conflict break out? (09.03.15). 
Kasman Hi Ahmad (21.02.15) answered the question ‘what factors he 
considered important for ending the communal wars’ with: ‘Several factors, 
first of all the people realised that the conflict was useless. So it is all because 
of that and that Jakarta gave increased power to TNI’. Faisal Djajaluddin 
answered the same question with: ‘Well, I think [it ended] because of the 
awareness in the society of the suffering they had gone through, along with the 
support from the government and community leaders, they all wanted the war 
to end’ (18.02.15). In the interview with Ishak Naser (24.02.15), he stressed 
that the most important factors for ending the conflict were: 
The government in this case provided maximal support that was the most important—the 
phases of handling the conflict were done by the government to involve all stakeholders. The 
government’s first role was to alleviate the conflict by setting up police and military units…    
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Yet, as Tongo-Tongo and others highlighted above, the response from the GoI 
and the security forces came late. Indeed, the security forces had failed to stop 
most of the violent episodes before the positions had become more or less 
locked in Muslim/Christian strongholds. However, TNI’s initial failures in 
NMP must partly be blamed on late implementation of civil emergency.  Here, 
the concept of Indonesia as a hybrid political order brings lucidity on the case: 
First, as was outlined in the conceptual framework (3.4.2), illiberal peace-
building is often adopted by states being in a hybrid political order, where a 
key feature is a highly contested political environment. In the case of NMP, 
this was true both within, and outside NMP.  
In NMP, the local political elites’ manipulated longstanding ethno-religious 
divides to gain power. At the same time, outside NMP, challenges to the 
authority of the GoI were even more pressing (see 1.1), which contributed to a 
slow GoI reaction in NMP. Furthermore, following the characteristics of a 
hybrid political order, the Kao-Malifut conflict certainly involved the notion of 
overlapping power-claims relating to the logic of a traditional informal 
societal order versus the formal state, since the Kao had disputed the 
establishment of kecamatan Malifut, based on traditional adat ownership. 
Thus, to sum up the influence of GoI’s illiberal adoption of more power to the 
security forces, I conclude that it was effective, once it was introduced. Yet, as 
pointed out by interviewees and people at the grassroots level (RCA Tobelo 
area, 2015), this measure came late and elements within the security forces had 
also been provoking the local population at times. In an economic development 
perspective, the military blockades meant that people could not work in the 
fields/gardens and trading networks were cut off. In addition, the infrastructure 
was damaged and the workforce was depleted as a result of the high death toll 
and displacement. On an abstract level, this can be viewed in light of the 
‘conflict-development nexus’ (see 3.2) and shows that even when violence has 
ended, negative impacts still linger.  
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Besides, restoring authoritarian-style powers to TNI in NMP were the first, but 
not the last, of the illiberal peace-building tools used by the GoI at this time. 
The next move involved halting some of the newly introduced democratic 
reforms, for example, (re)establishing central control of the regional autonomy 
processes, such as pemekaran (Smith 2014). Accordingly, as Claire Smith 
(2009: 175) revealed in her dissertation, the GoI withdrew the power from the 
local governments by implementing ‘caretaker administrators’, directly under 
the power of GoI’s ‘temporary’ proxy governors in both MP and NMP. This 
freezing of the newly introduced regional autonomy reform extended even 
beyond the civil emergency status, up until the first direct local elections in 
2005; this was clearly a highly illiberal way of consolidating security.  
Neo-patrimonialism is a further feature of illiberal peace-building, and in the 
case of NMP, the GoI established neo-patrimonial networks with their hand-
picked governor, Thaib Armaiyn, giving him control of the huge recovery 
budget, which meant marginalising the other factions who had violently 
competed for this position in 1999-2000 (Smith 2014). These illiberal policies 
worked, if judged by the consolidation, (and almost 15 years of durability), of 
a negative peace. However, as briefly outlined above, they also had several 
costs. First, large portions of the aid budget were corrupted by Thaib Armaiyn 
and his patronage network. Second, the illiberal approach meant not 
prosecuting local elites for their role in the wars. Third, it seriously damaged 
the democratic reform processes, as institutional building was postponed, this 
also involved ignoring corruption within the judiciary (Smith 2014). Thus, the 
illiberal approach did involve serious costs, as outlined above. However, a 
prolonged communal war would most likely have been worse, given the loss 
of life, displacement and negative impact on development in general. Still, all 
acknowledgements for the successful consolidation of peace in NMP must not 
go to the GoI, which will be further explained below, as the focus turns to peace 
and reconciliation efforts anchored from below. 
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5.4 Adat’s Effect on Peace and Reconciliation 
As discussed earlier, peace-building in general and reconciliation efforts in 
particular, were anchored from below in NMP. However, as was presented in the 
conceptual framework (see 3.6.1) most violent conflicts result in physical and 
emotional separations, which feed on continued uncertainty, anger and fear—that 
need to be reduced in order to build a sustainable peace. Here, the GoI must receive 
some credit, as their illiberal security approach (even if implemented very late) did 
remove much of the uncertainty and fear between the two communities. Some of 
the violence had (in the end) been triggered by a security dilemma, which resulted 
in ‘pre-emptive’ attacks by both sides, as they were convinced of imminent attacks 
from their opponents (Wilson 2008). Furthermore, the GoI’s statement (delivered 
through the provincial government) to the local elites in North Halmahera, which 
said that Tobelo will not become the capital of the future NHR, unless the situation 
is calmed and they can help facilitate safe returns of the IDPs (Duncan 2014: 113). 
This incentive greatly contributed to convincing the elite (see also prior discussion 
in this chapter), particularly in Tobelo and Galela, to work hard to reconcile their 
communities, as put by one of the elite leaders, Tongo-Tongo (09.03.15): 
When the conflict was over and we started the reconciliation process, I functioned as an adat 
leader [conflict leader during violence]. We hoped that the adat approach could work to solve 
the conflict, considering that we derive from the same ancestors, we have strong bonds to each 
other.                                     
Elite leaders like Tongo-Tongo and Hein Namotemo pointed also to the success of 
the strong adat culture among the different sub-groups constituting the Kaos. This 
had involved an adat oath for unity in 1999, which indeed kept them united 
throughout the whole communal war, because according to the local cosmology, 
the one breaking an adat oath will suffer illness and death (Duncan 2014: 113). 
Adat ties had also prevented religious conflict on Kakara Island, as the majority 
Christian community protected their Muslim neighbours, until they could be safely 
evacuated to a nearby island (Duncan 2009: 1088). Thus, even though adat had 
actually failed to prevent much of the violence, it was still considered as the peace 
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approach with best potential to bridge the religious divide. The efforts were initiated 
from the local elite’, however, it gradually received more and more support at 
grassroots level, in light of widespread conflict fatigue and a realisation among 
people in general that the wars had chiefly brought death and destruction to them 
(RCAs in Kao and Tobelo areas, 2015) and the same theme was evident among all 
elite/expert respondents as well.  
It seems thus that the theoretical arguments in favour of localised designs (see 3.6) 
best fit with the process in NMP, as local leaders took a leading role based on 
notions of adat, as opposed to cookie cutter approaches, instigated from a central 
government or INGOs, where emphasis rather is on improving law enforcement, 
human rights and truth commissions (Bräuchler 2009a). Interesting to note 
regarding the use of adat within NMP, is that it was articulated in different ways, 
depending on area, yet sharing features of an open space—mainly aiming to bridge 
the religious divide, which had subsequently become the strongest dividing factor 
in the wars. For example, in Tobelo, Hibualamo (the traditional long house) has 
been revitalised. Faisal Djajaluddin explained (18.02.15): 
Hibualamo exists as a result of our ancient local wisdom found in North and West Halmahera. 
In West Halmahera it is called ‘sasadu’ even though it has a similar house shape like 
Hibualamo. Physically it is a house, but philosophically, it means a meeting place for diverse 
people and communities. The immigrants can also visit Hibualamo.  
Husen Alting (28.02.15) had a similar understanding of the use of adat: 
Adat is a very powerful instrument for peace in North Maluku. Actually it is not only 
Hibualamo, but adat from all areas of North Maluku are being applied to the reconciliation 
process… the immigrants who live here have to take part in the local wisdom of North 
Maluku. 
Zadrak Tongo-Tongo (09.03.15) agreed as well: 
We hope that the adat approach can work to solve the conflict. Considering that we have 
derived from the same ancestors, the adat approach is a bit like a family approach. Even 
though we have many newcomers here from different areas in Indonesia, with different 
ethnicities, we decided that we must try to gather all different groups under Hibualamo [in 
Tobelo], yet these groups should still keep their diversity. 
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Tongo-Tongo was also one of few respondents who reflected upon the fact that the 
notions of adat used to reconcile the communities after the wars, were not very 
conservative:  
On special occasions [in the past] where many ethnic groups from around Indonesia were 
gathered, it was a bit ironic, because it was only the Tobelos that did not have special 
traditional clothes… we just have a traditional hat. But now we have got inspiration from 
outside and we modernised our tradition. Now, on every Thursday, all students and civil 
servants wear ‘traditional Tobelo batik’… 
Another dimension, or motivating factor, was articulated by one of the older 
respondents (working in the regency government), M Roke Saway (10.03.15) 
stressed: 
Civil society, but especially the people, had the biggest role compared to the government. You 
can see up until today, we do not have conflict, because the peace came from the people, and 
it started with self-awareness… People also realised that they would like to die in the places 
where they come from.  
These accounts reveal some important aspects regarding the notion of adat that I 
believe are integral to the successful consolidation of peace in NMP. They are 
anchored first in the particular culture of each area within NMP31, yet sharing the 
important aspect of being a meeting place that are inclusive also to newcomers, and 
different ethnic and/or minority groups. Further, as it has been evident that the 
revitalisation of adat has been pragmatic, where most communities seems to have 
managed to  downplay their religious identities, by rearticulating an adat rhetoric, 
or discourse, focused on their common ethnicity and/or culture(s).  
Even if a common ethnicity often was a part of the focus, that notion was not 
exclusive, as all people were encouraged to be part of this community-based 
traditional reconciliation, aiming at countering religious-based provocation in the 
future. It seems thus to be avoiding one of the pitfalls of cultural approaches, which 
is a too exclusive character that are not open for other ethnic or minority groups 
(Acciaioli 2001). There were also people arguing that more actors deserve credit 
                                                          
31 An example of the vast (cultural) diversity within the Moluccas, is the fact that these provinces 
encompass 130 language communities (Duncan 2009).   
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for contributing to the absence of new conflicts, since the introduction of the adat 
approach.  Examples of this include religious leaders, which were mentioned to 
have, in general, supported and actively promoted the notion of adat. Since 
religious leaders often possess considerable informal authority within their 
community in NMP, their cooperation with adat leaders must be considered one of 
the keys to the consolidation of peace. Their pragmatic amenability in this case is 
significant, because historically, there have been a lot of frictions between religion 
and adat, where some religious leaders have argued that certain adat traditions are 
incompatible with (strict) Islam or Christianity (Hefner 2011). Furthermore, both 
during the RCA studies (2015), as well as in many elite interviews, people 
mentioned positive impacts in their communities relating to programmes 
implemented by local NGOs or INGOs, as Roswita Mubin Abow (28.02.15) 
explained:  
We [the UNDP] used to involve important leaders like, religious leaders, tokoh pemuda [youth 
leaders] and adat leaders in our programmes since they could help bring people together. We 
had programmes with football, sports and arts, to bring the communities together… and my 
team [UNDP] involved both Christians and Muslims [from the Moluccas], and we were a very 
solid team.   
These mixed-faith working teams served as an example of inter-faith collaboration 
for peace and many people at the grassroots have given credit to UNDP, World 
Vision, Unicef, Red Cross, Save the Children, Mercy Corps as well as several local 
NGOs like Dormala, PML and Forum Studi Halmahera, for having had positive 
impacts in their communities, covering issues from re-construction to mental 
rehabilitation and many others.  
In addition, during the RCA in the Tobelo area (2015), several locals’ highlighted 
a philanthropic initiative that they regarded very successful; a man called ‘Pak 
David’, who had emigrated to Germany before the communal wars, returned in 
2003 and wanted to contribute to reconciling his former home village. Apart from 
donating construction material for houses, he purchased a relatively big fishing boat 
and created a fishing cooperative with the requirement that the workers must be 
inter-religiously mixed. Villagers said this was great for reconciliation, as well as 
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helping the suffering economy. Another finding from the RCA in this area was the 
‘provocateur narrative’ advocated by a few people. Although this narrative is more 
or less a conspiracy theory32, it works as a unifying factor, as it suggests that much 
of the violence had been driven by ‘outsiders’ (e.g., (national) political elites, 
military units, or sometimes also including people from other areas in NMP (RCA 
Tobelo area, 2015).  
This tendency is common in post-conflict scenarios, as it is a strategy reducing the 
in-groups’ feelings of collective guilt. One the one hand, this may hamper 
admissions of guilt by perpetrators. Yet, on the other hand, it can promote 
reconciliation efforts, as it bridges the division of the local communities. This has 
contributed to reducing incentives for post-conflict violence in parts of the 
Moluccas (Björkhagen 2013). Moving back to the conceptual framework, I would 
argue that the above discussed efforts, in line with the adat approach, have 
contributed to a peace and reconciliation process that fulfils the first important 
objective of reconciliation, which is peaceful coexistence (Sampson 2003), or 
‘reconciliation as resignation’ (Bhargava 2012). The empirical findings indicate 
that both sides have shared a desire to reconcile in line with a pragmatic approach, 
based on what they have in common. Since the wars in NMP ended in a stalemate 
in NHR, both sides realised that they had to adapt and working towards mutual 
respect for each other’s different identities and grow a common humanity, deprived 
of dehumanisations of the ‘religious other’ (RCA Tobelo area, 2015).  
Since the vast majority of the local people had suffered significantly from the 
violence, they wanted to end hostilities and reconcile, as has been suggested by the 
empirical findings (and secondary sources). Attitudes and behaviour did change, as 
was essential according to the framework.  However, I would not argue that the 
strongest notion of reconciliation, as theorised by Bhargava (see 3.6.2), has been 
fully accomplished in NHR or Ternate. In the latter location, many Christian IDPs 
never returned for various reasons, thus the communities did never really have the 
                                                          
32 Yet, when related to elements within the security forces, there is evidence of provocateurs 
(Wilson 2008: 188).   
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chance to reconcile there. The Christian respondent in Ternate, Theis Hoke, stressed 
that relations were ‘back to normal’, yet he also mentioned discrimination towards 
Christians (e.g., difficult to get permits to build a church). In addition, in relation to 
the requirements for ‘strong’ reconciliation, I argue that NMP and NHR have not 
reached such a condition, for example ‘owning-up of responsibility for wrongdoing 
followed by forgiveness’ (Bhargava 2012: 371).  
In NMP, the issue of culpability, has been largely absent from the peace and 
reconciliation process. Especially the local elite have stressed the importance of 
moving on and forgetting the violence. This was manifested in the local peace 
agreement, and government officials maintained that assigning blame to individuals 
or groups, risked sparking new violence, as the Christian and Muslim narratives 
seldom were identical, coupled with a justice system incapable of prosecuting the 
large number of people involved in the communal conflicts (Duncan 2014: 114). 
The next chapter will discuss some of these results, in relation to the previous 
findings and discuss their possible implications in a wider perspective.    
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6 Concluding Reflections    
 
In relation to the first research question, the analysis found that several legacies 
from the era of European colonialism, have lingered on in the Moluccas. The 
conceptual framework revealed several strategies used by the colonial powers to 
enforce their rule, for example dividing the local population. A common tactic of 
division was to reinforce existing local elite rulers, as this enabled more efficient 
accumulation of wealth for the colonisers (Li 2007: 32).  
The legacies of that practice are still evident in today’s NMP as some local elite 
actors (e.g., the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore), cemented their power because 
they were allies of opposing colonial powers. In addition, the analysis found that 
colonialism also had brought Christian missionaries with them to the Moluccas. As 
the Dutch colonial administration treated the Christian converts preferential, 
compared to locals who adhered to Islam or animist religions, this quickly divided 
the Moluccan society along religious lines. As discussed in the analysis, this led to 
significant horizontal inequalities between Muslims and Christians that must be 
considered one of the factors contributing to the communal wars. Religious 
segregation is still the norm throughout NMP and most private educational 
institutions are still segregated depending on religion. Furthermore, students only 
learn about their own religion in school. In addition, Indonesians still have to choose 
from one of the six officially recognised religions, for example on the national 
identification cards. In the light of this and the lingering religious segregation in 
NMP, it could be fruitful for future research to explore the role of Indonesian 
institutions, in relation to religious segregation.           
Furthermore, the framework gave account of neo-patrimonialism, which affects the 
governance structure negatively, as a common characteristic was corruption of state 
assets by local elite, which are most interested in strengthening their own position, 
and thus govern like a family patriarch (Kohli 2004: 393). The analysis 
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demonstrated that neo-patrimonial patterns were recognised in NMP, especially in 
relation to the Kao-Malifut conflict. Here, the Makian-dominated local government 
was shown to have been a major contributing factor to the communal conflict, as 
their main concern had been to reinforce their own position of power, relating to 
the promotion of kecamatan Malifut, an area including a profitable gold mine. The 
resulting ethno-religious conflict with the Kaos was the start of large-scale 
communal war in NMP. The Makians’ role further highlights the great importance 
of paying attention to local context and its complexities, as the dominance of the 
Makians goes against the general colonial legacy of Muslim marginalisation in the 
Moluccas—in the Makian-Kao conflict, it was indeed the majority Christian Kao 
group being the most marginalised. The analysis further provided evidence that 
problematise the view often found in comparative studies—that the conflicts in the 
Moluccas was only about religion.       
In relation to neo-patrimonial legacies, the findings from the RCA in Kao area 
(2015) were very interesting; today both Makians and Kaos share an anger towards 
the neo-patrimonial governance of NHR, as both groups claim the political elite in 
the regency government are partly responsible for the large corruption of funds 
from the gold mine, which are supposed to contribute to community development 
(RCA Kao area, 2015). Since my fieldwork was indeed limited in time and space, 
further explorations of this new tension in NHR could provide the basis for 
profitable future research. Could corruption by neo-patrimonial elites be a threat to 
sustainable peace in NMP? 
The analysis also dealt with the question of how the swift decentralisation process 
affected the communal wars and peace-building in NMP. The framework (see Van 
Klinken 2007) suggested that even though this process in theory involves 
democratic benefits, there are looming dangers of corruption and competition 
among local elites, if this process comes with substantial resources (and poor anti-
corruption monitoring). The analysis clearly showed that the latter scenario 
unfortunately was the case in NMP, as many of the conflicts involved mobilisation 
along ethno-religious lines, by local elites struggling to gain control of the (soon-
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to-be) lucrative positions within provincial and local governments. The interview 
with Roswita Mubin Abow confirmed this view, whereas other interviewees’ did 
not highlight the decentralisation process as significant. Yet, this denial must of 
course be considered in relation to the fact that some respondents are part of the 
indicted group. In the e-mail interview with Christopher Duncan, he argued that the 
decentralisation process, after the communal wars, also had contributed to the 
peace-building process. He stressed that, given the fact that a lot of resources were 
allocated to various regencies and sub-districts, ‘there are simply too much money 
to be made these days to let the violence happen again’ (10.06.15).  
However, the findings from the emic perspective also highlighted voices arguing 
that the decentralisation had only been good for majority groups, while minority 
groups who were less represented in politics, face continued marginalisation (RCA 
Kao area, 2015). Yet, my study cannot make any wide generalisations regarding 
this matter. Thus, it could be useful if future research investigated the situation of 
other minority groups within NMP, in relation to the effects of decentralisation, 
preferably by adopting a longitudinal research design.                         
The next research question focused on exploring how GoI’s illiberal peace-building 
approach had affected the conflicts, and the subsequent peace and development. 
The analysis, aided by the framework, found that the illiberal efforts were effective 
in order to consolidate a negative peace and regain peaceful co-existence. However, 
the illiberal means also contributed to a lack of ‘deeper’ reconciliation, as many 
victims still feel anger over the fact that not even the leaders of communal 
massacres have been prosecuted (RCA Tobelo area, 2015). Further research could 
benefit from a deeper scrutinizing of the illiberal measures sustainability, in a longer 
perspective. In relation to other similarly affected areas, the consolidation of peace 
in NMP is a rare success so far in my view, which is in line with conclusions found 
in some previous research (Barron, Azca et al. 2012). Thus, the adoption of the 
illiberal peace-building model must be considered in relation to a very difficult 
transition period, where Indonesia was in a hybrid political order, in the very 
beginning of a democratisation and state-building process. In relation to the 
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research question dealing with reconciliation, the analysis suggests that the reasons 
behind the success of the adat approach are indeed multifaceted; widespread 
conflict fatigue, a history that includes peaceful coexistence, and kinship ties 
sometimes crossing religion (hence the label family approach by some respondents) 
and the outsider ‘provocateur’ narrative, are all factors that have contributed to 
today’s peaceful coexistence, which constitutes the thin notion of reconciliation. 
Thus, the people were not reconciled just because of adat, but the notion of adat 
was successfully revitalised and rearticulated because people wanted peace and 
reconciliation.  
Adat thus became the strongest unifying factor, which provided a framework for 
reconciliation that indeed unified the society at different levels. Synergy effects 
were created as the process involved actors from the grassroots and the local 
government. Besides, where adat could not help, such as certain development 
issues (e.g., re-building infrastructure) support was provided by local CSOs/NGOs, 
often supported by INGOs, which in general managed to avoid sponsoring cookie 
cutter approaches (which were highlighted as pitfalls in the framework). However, 
during the RCA (Tobelo area, 2015), there were local people who expressed, in 
private, feelings of anger towards the fact that people (from the other religious 
community) responsible for killing their family members, had not faced any legal 
consequences.  
However, the same people had themselves chosen to return to this mixed-faith 
village (where some of the perpetrators still live) after the wars, which also reveals 
a desire to move on, in my view. Nonetheless, the weak rule of law, security forces 
inaction and the fact that some of the leaders of the violence now enjoy high 
positions in the local and provincial governments, are potentially dangerous, as it 
sends out a message that the use of violence can pay off, coupled with a general 
lack of trust in democratic institutions (Wilson 2015). Therefore, it is positive that 
the current President of Indonesia, Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo, has already enforced 
stronger anti-corruption measures, which recently has put the former governor of 
North Maluku, Thaib Armaiyn behind bars for his involvement in corruption of the 
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IDP funds in NMP (e-mail interview Chris Wilson). Thus, Indonesia seems to move 
in the right direction, as anti-corruption and governance are slowly improving. In 
some cases in this thesis, we have seen that the etic and emic perspectives differed, 
as the drivers and motivations associated with the elite, were not the same as 
described by many of the local people, who had indeed been more physically 
involved in the wars and peace-building. This should not be seen as a weakness in 
the study. Instead, it can be said to demonstrate the importance of embracing 
multiple realities and triangulating different perspectives, when trying to solve a 
complex puzzle.  
The inclusion of the emic perspective also served the purpose of bridging the 
identified research gap, as most previous research has indeed trivialised the 
important grassroots perspective.33 To conclude, I hope this study has fulfilled its 
aim of being a modest contribution to existing research, implementing the RCA 
methodology in a new research context, as well as flagging up some interesting 
issues for future research. Lastly, I agree with Chris Wilson (2015: 1331) and Birgit 
Bräuchler (2015), who stress the importance for future research to further explore 
peace and reconciliation in contemporary Indonesia.                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 However, Chris Wilson and particularly Christopher Duncan, are exceptions to the elitist bias in 
previous research.    
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A – Interview Schedule 
 
In-depth Interviews 
 
 
E-mail Interviews 
 
Wilson, C. (2015). [chris.wilson@auckland.ac.nz]. RE: Peace and Reconciliation.  
E-mail reply to [martin_bjorkhagen@hotmail.com]. Sent 07.06.15. [Accessed 07.06.15].  
 
Duncan, C. (2015). [CrDuncan@asu.edu]. RE: Peace and Reconciliation. 
E-mail reply to [martin_bjorkhagen@hotmail.com]. Sent 10.06.15. [Accessed 11.06.15]. 
Interview
Date Name Sex Age Ethnicity Religion Occupation Location
18.02.15 Faisal Djajaluddin M 34 N/A Islam Editor Malut Pos (Newspaper)
Ternate
21.02.15 Kasman Hi Ahmad M N/A N/A Islam Rector Muhammadiyah and PDI-P's 
candidate for Regency election (2015-2020) Ternate
24.02.15 Ishak Naser M 47 N/A Islam Vice-chairman DPRD, National Democratic 
Party  (NasDem) Ternate
25.02.15 Mahmud Adi M 27 Makian Islam Lecturer Khairun University, (and previously 
a child soldier during the wars). Ternate
28.02.15 Husen Alting M N/A N/A Islam Rector Khairun University, former member 
the local NGO 'LML'  Ternate
28.02.15 Roswita Mubin Abow F 38 Ternate Islam Lecturer Khairun University, (UNDP local staff) 
Ternate
09.03.15 Zadrak Tongo-Tongo M 68 Tobelo Christian Former civil servant in DPRD, (conflict leader 
during the wars) Tobelo
10.03.15 M Roke Saway M 53 N/A Islam 1st Assistent to the Regent of North Halmahera
Tobelo
29.03.15 Theis Hoke M 30 Ternate Christian IT Entrepreneur Ternate City (one of the few 
Christian IDPs that moved back to Ternate Ternate
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Appendix B – Interview Guide 
1. Did you live in North Maluku at the time of the communal wars and later during 
the post-conflict period up until today? Did you have to move because of the 
conflicts? 
 
2. What factors do you consider were important for ending the communal wars, so 
the peace-process could start? 
 
3. What effect do you consider the Malino II peace agreement had for the peace-
process? 
 
4. In September 2003, former President Megawati signed the Presidential 
Instruction No. 6 (Inpres) that gave instructions to coordinating ministries to 
prioritise recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. How did 
initiatives, such as this, from the central government effect the peace and 
reconciliation process, in your opinion? 
 
5. Both the provincial and local governments have made efforts to re-integrate the 
large number of internally displaced peoples (IDPs). How has this worked out in 
practice, in your view? 
 
6. How has the decentralisation process influenced the peace-building? 
 
7. What roles have been played by the civil society, in your view? 
 
8. Following the declaration of civil emergency on 27 June 2000, the military took 
part in many of the early reconciliation efforts, especially in North Halmahera. 
What is you view of the role the military has played for the peace and 
reconciliation process? 
 
9. What roles have been played by religious leaders for reconciliation of 
communities that were often divided along religious lines during the communal 
wars? 
 
10. During the conflict, some media operators were also divided along religious lines. 
Has that situation changed today? 
 
11. What influence has the media reports had for the consolidation of peace, in your 
view? 
 
12. North Maluku has a long history of peaceful co-existence and cooperation 
between different religious, and ethnic, communities. What is your view of the 
integration and reconciliation situation today? 
 
13. Some communities have tried to reconcile their communities by revitalise 
different adat traditions, for example by the Tobelo that focused to emphasise 
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common adat traditions and a common ethnicity. Has this had a positive impact 
on reconciliation in communities with this focus? How has the effect been for 
non-indigenous people?  
 
14. Large recovery funds have been distributed to North Maluku for recovery/peace-
building work. In what ways have this materialised? 
 
15. Has the socio-economic inequalities between different groups decreased after the 
end of the conflict, in your view?  
 
16. Has the end of the conflict involved increased economic development for the 
majority of the population of North Maluku, in your view? 
 
17. How has the integration of former combatants been facilitated by the provincial, 
or local, government? 
 
18. Very few people have been convicted for crimes during the communal wars, for 
example massacres involving women and children. Some maintain this to be 
good for the maintenance of peace, since incarceration of some (and not others), 
may spur new conflicts. Others argue that this is tells that war-crimes are 
tolerated in times of violence. What is your view? 
 
19. In many parts of Indonesia, criminal preman groups are still being used by some 
politicians to mobilise support. Is this a problem also in North Maluku in your 
view? What influence for reconciliation?        
 
20. There have been some recovery/peace-building programmes implemented by 
international development organisations, for example by UNDP, Save the 
Children etc. What is your view of the effect of these efforts for consolidating 
peace in the province? 
 
21. UNDP’s own evaluation stated that their recovery and peace-building 
programmes often failed to pay attention to gender questions, i.e. the social and 
economic empowerment of women and their involvement in peace-building. 
What do you think about the role given to women in this process and how has 
that effected the reconciliation? 
 
22. There have also been many efforts by local NGOs regarding peace-building and 
reconciliation. What influence have these efforts had? 
 
23. What role, if any, has the sultan of Tidore, and his followers, had for the peace 
and reconciliation process, in your view? 
 
24. What role, if any, has the sultan of Ternate, and his followers, had for the peace 
and reconciliation process, in your view? 
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25. What roles, if any, have the sultan of Bacan and Jailolo, and their followers, have 
for the peace and reconciliation process, in your view? 
 
26. What do you think is important to improve further regarding the peace and 
reconciliation process in the future?       
 
27. Is there some question you think I have missed to ask, or anything you would like 
to add?  
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Appendix C – Informed Consent Form 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
 
Project Information 
Project Title:  After the Communal Wars: Peace, Development and 
Reconciliation in North Maluku 
Organisation:  Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, 
Lund University, Sweden.  
Student researcher:  Martin Björkhagen:                                    +6281315103651      
                                  bjorkhagen@gmail.com  
Local Supervisor:  Diana Soraya Assoufy           +6221 7206616 
   Diana.Assoufy@grminternational.com 
 
Swedish Supervisor: Dr. Kristina Jönsson:     +46462228943                                                     
             kristina.jonsson@svet.lu.se 
 
1. Purpose of the Study 
My name is Martin Björkhagen, and I am a master student in Development Studies, 
majoring in Political Science at Lund University. This study is being carried out 
with an overall aim of gaining deeper understanding of the different factors that 
have contributed to the consolidation of peace in North Maluku Province, after the 
communal conflicts. This further involves studying the reconciliation and 
development processes connected to this. I am inviting you to participate in this 
interview because your experience with, or knowledge of, the peace, development 
Prospective research participant: Please read this form carefully and do not hesitate to ask 
any questions that may arise, before you decide whether you want to participate in this 
research study. Participants are free to ask questions at any time before, during, or after 
participation. 
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or reconciliation processes. This research thus seeks to make a modest contribution 
to previous research regarding the post-conflict scenario in North Maluku by 
adopting a qualitative approach, which former studies rarely have done.  
 
2. Participation 
If you are willing to participate, you will take part in an in-depth interview. There 
is no fixed time frame for the interview, as different questions may generate various 
answers from different participants. I will ask questions about your general opinion 
in relation to the topic of the study, and also how you have experienced different 
processes of peace, development and reconciliation etcetera. The interview can take 
place at a location of your personal choice, where you feel most comfortable. With 
your permission, I seek the permission to audio record the interview, which 
increases the validity of the study. Yet, the recording is optional and you may also 
decline to answer certain question if you wish.  
 
3. Confidentiality 
With your consent, I would like to use the information you provide in the interview 
for the study, which involves your name. Please consider the possible implications 
of your identity being known to people outside the study. If you consider that your 
name and identity could result in any risk for you, it is best to remain anonymous 
in the study and I will thus replace your name. If your title would reveal your 
identity, I would also not include it in the published study.  
 
4. Benefits 
There are no financial benefits for participating in this study. However, your 
participation is very much appreciated and important, in order to increase the 
understanding of the consolidation of peace in North Maluku, and can contribute to 
a wider discussions of successful peace-building and development, after communal 
conflict.  
 
5. Your Rights 
You are entirely free to choose whether or not you want to participate and you may 
terminate your participation at any time of the study, by notifying me, or any of my 
supervisors. If this choice is made after an interview, I will delete all information 
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obtained during the interview. You are always free to contact me or my supervisors 
for any questions regarding the study. Your consent does not take away any legal 
rights in the case of negligence or other legal fault of anyone involved in this study. 
This consent form does not replace any applicable laws. Your signature below 
indicates that you voluntarily consent to participate and that you have received a 
copy of this consent form for your own records.  
 
 
I do____ /Do not____ agree to my interview being recorded.  
Participant Name:_______________ Age: _____Occupation: 
______________________   
Optional information; Ethnicity: ________Religion: ______ Place of 
birth:___________ 
Place of residence during the communal wars: ___________Place after the 
wars:_______  
 
Participant Signature: ________________________ Date:    
Researcher Signature: ________________________ Date: 
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Appendix D – Pictures from the RCAs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demonstration (about to begin) against corruption of the community development 
funds, from the ‘1%’ of the revenues from the Gosowong goldmine, Kao RCA, 2015. 
Anti-corruption demonstration in Tobelo City, March 2015.  
89 
 
 
 
 
The newly-built Hibualamo in Tobelo City, finished in 2007, on the 
initiative of Hein Namotemo’s regency administration, in NHR.  
The accompanying text at the Hibualamo site, revealing some of the discourse 
relating to the revitalised adat. 
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Mass grave for Muslims who 
were killed in this village during 
the communal wars. 
Graffiti at a youth hangout place in Kao. 
Israeli-motifs are often seen in Christian areas, 
and pro-Palestine motifs more frequently in 
Muslim areas.  
Soya-soya dance in Gurabunga, Tidore. It is a war dance, but is also used for special 
occasions (e.g. welcoming important guests or celebrating Tidore-day). The white 
flags represent Tidore, as opposed to yellow, which is Ternate’s colour.  
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Many churches and mosques are newly re-built (after having been destroyed during 
the wars), some are even still under construction in NMP. Above from Malifut area, 
down left from Sosol (Malifut), and down right—a new church in Tobelo. 
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The rumah adat (traditional adat houses) come in various shapes, some are old, some 
new. Popon village (up-left), Kiematubu (up-right), Kakara Island (middle) and the 
newly-built Hibualamo in Tobelo (below). The latter is connected to the bigger 
Hibualamo, displayed at the cover page.    
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RCA photos: My interpreter and I are about to accompany women 
in the village to the gardens to collect vegetables (above). Below I 
am having an informal conversation with a neighbour and her 
daughter, while doing laundry—both during the Tobelo RCA. 
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To the right is my HHH during the Kao RCA. The house to the left belongs to their 
neighbour, who suddenly improved his house and bought an expensive SUV, 
after becoming a member of NHM’s CSR committee. 
The status of NMP’s waste management leaves room for improvements, as a lot of 
trash are put into the rivers (left). To the right is one of many houses displaying 
football motifs, a sport that is immensely popular in the Moluccas—and was used to 
bring youths together after the conflicts. 
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One of the adat-influenced regency government buildings in NHR 
(above). Below is the volcanic Makian Island.   
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Above is the Kiematubu volcano on Tidore. Below is a photo from the 
funeral of the (48th) Sultan of Ternate, Mudaffar Sjah, who passed 
away during my fieldwork. 
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